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xABSTRACT
Establishing secret common randomness between two or multiple devices in a network
resides at the root of communication security. In its most frequent form of key establish-
ment, the problem is traditionally decomposed into a randomness generation stage (ran-
domness purity is subject to employing often costly true random number generators) and an
information-exchange agreement stage, which relies either on public-key infrastructure or on
symmetric encryption (key wrapping).
This dissertation has been divided into two main parts. In the ﬁrst part, an algorithm
called KERMAN is proposed to establish secret-common-randomness for ad-hoc networks,
which works by harvesting randomness directly from the network routing metadata, thus
achieving both pure randomness generation and (implicitly) secret-key agreement. This al-
gorithm relies on the route discovery phase of an ad-hoc network employing the Dynamic
Source Routing protocol, is lightweight, and requires relatively little communication over-
head. The algorithm is evaluated for various network parameters, and diﬀerent levels of
complexity, in OPNET network simulator. The results show that, in just ten minutes, thou-
sands of secret random bits can be generated network-wide, between diﬀerent pairs in a
network of ﬁfty users.
The proposed algorithm described in this ﬁrst part of this research study has inspired
study of the problem of generating a secret key based on a more practical model to be
explored in the second part of this dissertation. Indeed, secret key establishment from com-
mon randomness has been traditionally investigated under certain limiting assumptions, of
which the most ubiquitous appears to be that the information available to all parties comes
xi
in the form of independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) samples of some correlated
random variables. Unfortunately, models employing the i.i.d assumption are often not accu-
rate representations of real scenarios. A more capable model would represent the available
information as correlated hidden Markov models (HMMs), based on the same underlying
Markov chain. Such a model accurately reﬂects the scenario where all parties have access
to imperfect observations of the same source random process, exhibiting a certain time de-
pendency. In the second part of the dissertation , a computationally-eﬃcient asymptotic
bounds for the secret key capacity of the correlated-HMM scenario has been derived. The
main obstacle, not only for this model, but also for other non-i.i.d cases, is the computational
complexity. This problem has been addressed by converting the initial bound to a product of
Markov random matrices, and using recent results regarding its convergence to a Lyapunov
exponent.
1CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION TO THE
INFORMATION-THEORETIC CRYPTOGRAPHY
1.1 Introduction
Information-theoretic methods are among the most important approaches in the ﬁeld of
security whose merit is that they require no assumptions about computational capabilities of
adversaries. The introduction of these methods goes backs to 1949, when Shannon initially
studied the secrecy based on the model in Figure 1.1.
In this model, plain text message (M) is encrypted into ciphertext (C) by applying a
shared key (K) at the transmitter, with the decryption process accomplished using the same
key at the receiver. The main goal is to transmit M in secrecy. Shannon deﬁned the system
to be perfectly secure if knowledge of the plaintext message cannot be achieved just by
knowing the ciphertext 1.
I(M ;C) = 0 (1.1)
Moreover, the receiver must have capability for decrypting the plaintext by knowing both
the ciphertext and the key.
H(M |C,K) = 0 (1.2)
By considering such conditions, Shannon [1], using a combinatorial proof, showed that
H(K) ≥ H(M). In other words, the length of the key should be larger than the length
1The preliminaries of information theory have been reviewed in Appendix A
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Figure 1.1 Shannon’s Model to Study the Secrecy
of the plaintext, a proposition known as ”Shannon’s pessimistic result”. Yeung [2] used a
technique based on an information diagram to prove the same result.
Wyner [3] in 1975 introduced a wiretap channel and studied this models secrecy capacity.
Wyner’s model consists of two channels; the ﬁrst channel is located between legitimate users
(main channel) and second channel is located between a sender and an attacker (attacker’s
channel). Wyner assumed the main channel to be better than the attacker’s channel and
also assumed that the attacker is a passive attacker and cannot send any message into the
channels. The main goal in the wiretap model is to transmit message M in such a way that
the attacker can obtain no information about it. Wyner showed that in the wiretap model
there is no need for a pre-existing shared secret key between legitimate sender and receiver.
Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [4] generalized Wyner’s model by assuming that the attacker’s channel is
not inferior to the main channel, and studied the secrecy capacity of the new model, depicted
in Figure 1.2.
An important problem in the ﬁeld of security is generating a secret key, the basic tenet
of cryptography and secure communication. Generating a secret key based on information
theoretic methods was initially studied by Maurer [5] and Ahlswede and Csisza´r [6].
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Figure 1.2 Wiretap Model
In this chapter, the problem of generating a secret key between two users for the case of
independent and identically distributed (i.i.d) random variables is deﬁned, followed by the
exploration of prevalent concepts and tools employed in information-theoretic methods.
1.2 Generating Secret Key in the case of i.i.d Random Variables
Assume i.i.d repetition of (X, Y, Z) with joint probability distribution PXY Z . In the
process of generating a secret key, Alice, who can observe Xn, wants to produce secret
common randomness with Bob, who has access to Y n, by exchanging message F over a public
channel. This key should be hidden from the perspective of Eve who has side information
Zn and can also overhear the public communication.
The process of generating a secret key is composed of two phases: information reconcilia-
tion and privacy ampliﬁcation. The aim of the former is to generate (with high probability)
the same common information between the two parties. Since, in the information reconcili-
ation phase, two parties using public communication reveal some information to a potential
eavesdropper, the goal of privacy ampliﬁcation is to boost the security of the generated key
by extracting a (shorter) secret that is uniformly distributed over its space, given the ad-
versary’s knowledge. At the end of the protocol, Alice and Bob have random variables KA
4and KB for the secret key (Figure 1.5). This model for generating secret key is called the
source-type model. The two random variables must with high probability be the same and,
given Eve’s knowledge (F and Zn), their probability distribution must be uniform.
The techniques employed in i.i.d models are based on important theorems, most related
to typical sequences, packing lemma, Slepian-Wolf theorem, etc. (we have provided an
introduction to these concepts in Appendix A). In this section we will review methods for
generating a secret key in i.i.d models.
For simplicity, assume that, while Eve has no side information (there is no any Z), she can
overhear the public communication between Alice and Bob (F ). At the end of the process
of generating a secret key, KA and KB should with high probability be the same and their
distribution must be uniform. The key should also be independent of public communication.
In some literature, this condition is stated as follows.
I(F ;K) ≤  (1.3)
We will present an accurate deﬁnition of secret key in Chapter 3 of this thesis.
It can be proved that converse bound of the secret key length per observation in the i.i.d
framework is RK < I(X;Y ).
The achievability proof for this problem has been traditionally solved using random
binning and the Slepian-Wolf theorem. Intuitively, based on Slepian-Wolf theorem, if Alice
sends nH(X|Y ) bits to Bob, Bob can reconstruct Xn (this phase is called information
reconciliation phase) so that both Alice and Bob have nH(X) bits at their disposal while
nH(X|Y ) of these bits have been released. The secret key length per observation would
therefore be
1
n
(nH(X)− nH(X|Y )) = H(X)−H(X|Y ) = I(X;Y ) (1.4)
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As mentioned above, the exact proof of achievability is traditionally based on random
binning. Yassaee, et. al, [7] have proposed a new approach for the proof of achievability. This
proposed method, called output statistics of random binning (OSRB), can be considered
as a general framework for obtaining achievability results in network information theory
problems. In other words, it can be employed as an alternative approach instead of using
traditional packing and covering lemmas. The main idea in OSRB is exploiting duality
between problems. For example, they show that by observing the duality existing between
channel coding and secret key generation, the secret-key achievability rate can be derived.
Consider a DMC with message M and shared codebook F that can be considered as shared
randomness. By considering the model depicted in Figure 1.3 as a Bayesian network, the
joint probability distribution of this model can be written as follows.
P uniM PFPXn|MFPY n|XnPMˆ |FY n = (1.5)
PXnMFPY n|XnPMˆ |FY n =
PXnPMF |XnPY n|XnPMˆ |FY n =
PXnY nPMF |XnPY n|XnPMˆ |FY n
The last expression states the joint probability distribution for the generating secret key
model illustrated in Figure 1.4. Hence, by choosing R < I(X;Y ), the error probability of
6 
 
 
 
 
 
PY|X Encoder Decoder 
M 
F F 
Xn 
Yn 
M’ 
Figure 1.4 Source Secret Key Generation Model
these two models are the same and F and M are independent of one another, meeting all
the required conditions for generating a secret key.
1.2.1 OSRB Framework
As discussed earlier, the OSRB framework can be considered as an alternative method
for packing and covering lemmas, and in this section, after reviewing a simple form of two
important theorems in OSRB, we will employ them for solving the two earlier-mentioned
important problems.
Theorem 1. Consider (Xn1 , X
n
2 , Y
n) as an i.i.d repetition of distributed sources with joint
probability distribution PXn1 Xn2 Y n. Then, by assuming random binning (B1 and B2) as follows:
Bi : X ni → [1 : 2nRi ], i = 1, 2 (1.6)
if
R1 ≥ H(X1|X2Y ) (1.7)
R2 ≥ H(X2|X1Y )
R1 +R2 ≥ H(X1X2|Y )
7then
EB1B2(‖P˙ (xn1 , xn2 , yn, xˆn1 , xˆn2 )− P (xn1 , xn2 , yn) [xn1 = xˆn1 , xn2 = xˆn2 ]‖) → 0 (1.8)
as n goes to ∞.
Note that P˙ is the random probability distribution induced by two random binnings.
Theorem 1 is an equivalent form of the Slepian-Wolf theorem. [7]
Theorem 2. Consider (Xn1 , X
n
2 , X
n
3 ) as an i.i.d repetition of distributed sources with joint
probability distribution PX1X2X3. Then, by assuming random binning (B1 and B2) as follows:
Bi : X ni → [1 : 2nRi ], i = 1, 2 (1.9)
and if
R1 ≤ H(X1|X3) (1.10)
R2 ≤ H(X2|X3)
R1 +R2 ≤ H(X1X2|X3)
then
EB1B2(‖P˙ (b1(xn1 ), b2(xn2 ), xn3 , xˆn1 , xˆn2 )− P (xn3 )P uni(b1(xn1 ))P uni(b2(xn2 ))‖) → 0 (1.11)
as n goes to ∞.
In this theorem bi is the realization of Bi.
To apply the OSRB framework to solving the earlier-mentioned problem of generating a
secret key mentioned, let us assume in theorem 1 that if there is no Xn2 and X
n
1 = X
n, the
result is that if RF = R ≥ H(X|Y ), then Bob can reconstruct Xn. As discussed earlier, the
8 
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result is the equivalent of the Slepian-Wolf theorem. If Alice and Bob then apply another
random binning with rate Rk on the Xn and if Rf+RK < H(X), the output of this process is
uniformly distributed and independent of the output of the ﬁrst random binning. To achieve
this result we have used theorem 2 assuming X1 = X2 = X and no X3.
1.3 Preliminary Concepts in Generating Secret Keys for
non-i.i.d Cases
As mentioned earlier, the results of generating a secret key in the i.i.d cases are proved
using typicality arguments, and therefore cannot be employed in non-i.i.d models. In this
part the main tools to study non-i.i.d models have been explored.
1.3.1 Information Spectrum and Smooth Entropies
Let X be deﬁned as a general random variable with probability distribution of PX . The
information spectrum of the random variable X is the probability distribution of the random
variable log 1
PX
(this latter random variable is usually called the self-information of X). Two
9points of the information spectrum are of importance in this regard: Hmax(PX) = max log
1
PX
,
and Hmin(PX) = min log
1
PX
(see Figure 1.7). Loosely speaking, Hmax(PX) is related to
the number of bits required to reconstruct the random variable X. As an example, if the
minimum probability of a discrete random variable is 1
16
, in the worst-case scenario, X will
have 16 realizations each with probability 1
16
. So, the random variable can be deﬁned with 4
bits. In the same vein, Hmax(PXY |PY ) is the number of required bits to reconstruct X while
having perfect information of Y .
On the other hand, Hmin(PX) is roughly related to the number of intrinsic secure bits that
can be extracted from random variable X. As discussed in Deﬁnition 7 and 8, a secret key
has to have a uniform distribution. So for example, when a random variable X is distributed
uniformly over its four realizations, two secure bits can be extracted. Let X be distributed
over ten realizations. Except one realization with probability 1
4
, the probability of the rest
for each realization is 1
12
. Although X is not uniform, a uniform random variable can easily
be produced from X by bundling some realizations of X, as depicted in Figure 1.6 – in this
case, each mass point of the probability distribution of the new variable equals the maximum
of p(X). Even when bundling cannot produce a completely uniform random variable, the
result of bundling, over multiple samples, can be made close to the uniform distribution. This
closeness is usually measured by the statistical distance and will be discussed more in 1.3.2.
As intuition suggests, a form of Hmax(PXY |PY ) is a fundamental term in the information
reconciliation phase where Bob (with access to Y ) needs to reconstruct Alice’s signal (X).
Also, we will show thatHmin(PXZ |PZ) appears in the privacy ampliﬁcation phase where Alice
and Bob need to extract random bits form X while Eve has side information represented by
(Z).
More random bits can be generated in the privacy ampliﬁcation phase, and fewer bits
can be sent in the reconciliation phase, if a small amount of error can be tolerated. This
leads to considering probability distributions that are not identical, but statistically close to
10
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Figure 1.6 Converting random variable X to a uniform random variable
the true distribution. This is the core idea of smooth entropies [8], [9], [10]. As an example,
by ignoring the smallest probabilities of a random variable, the new Hmax can move slightly
to the left of the initial Hmax of the true distribution depicted in Figure 1.7. The new
Hmax is called the smooth maximum entropy. Formally, conditional maximum entropy and
conditional smooth maximum entropy are deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 1.
Hmax(PXY |PY ) = − log min
x∈Xy∈Y
PXY
PY
(1.12)
Hmax(PXY |PY ) = min
QXY ∈B(PXY )
Hmax(QXY |QY ) (1.13)
where B(PXZ) is the set of all non negative functions over X ×Y such that QXY ≤ PXY
and d(QXY , PXY ) ≤ , where d is the statistical distance.
Similarly, smooth minimum entropy is deﬁned by cutting down the largest probabilities
of a random variable [8]. With this process the new Hmin will be placed on the right side
of the Hmin of the true distribution. Heuristically more random bits can be generated by
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smooth minimum entropy, at the penalty that, with some small probability , the randomness
extraction process will completely fail. The formal deﬁnitions for minimum entropy and
conditional smooth minimum entropy are as follws.
Deﬁnition 2.
Hmin(PXZ |PZ) = − log max
x∈Xz∈Z
PXZ
PZ
(1.14)
Hmin(PXZ |PZ) = max
QXZ∈B(PXZ)
Hmin(QXZ |QZ) (1.15)
Not only are information spectrum methods useful in the single-shot scenario, but we can
extend the techniques to a sequence of length n. To study asymptotic behavior of a general
sequence Wn, two fundamental probabilistic operations, i.e, limit superior and limit inferior
(Figure 1.8) are deﬁned:
P − lim sup
n→∞
Wn ≡ inf{α| lim
n→∞
Pr{Wn > α} = 0} (1.16)
P − lim inf
n→∞
Wn ≡ sup{β| lim
n→∞
Pr{Wn < β} = 0} (1.17)
1.3.2 Randomness Extractors in Privacy Ampliﬁcation
Randomness extractors are used in the privacy ampliﬁcation phase. They take as input
the common sequence shared between Alice and Bob at the end of the information recon-
ciliation phase, and output a uniformly random (from the eavesdropper’s perspective) and
usually shorter sequence to be used as a secret key. There are two types of extractors: de-
terministic and seeded. In the former type, a ﬁxed function is employed to extract secret
bits from the known random variable. It can be observed that it is not possible to have a
deterministic extractor for general sources, as the following lemma, proved in [11] shows.
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Lemma 1. For any deterministic extractor E : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}, there exists a random
variable X with Hmin(X) ≥ n− 1 such that E(X) is constant.
To overcome this problem, seeded extractors are used instead. A little extra randomness
called seed is employed in this type of extractor.
Deﬁnition 3. Strong seeded extractor
A function E: {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}u is a (k, )-strong seeded extractor if for every
random variable X deﬁned on {0, 1}n with Hmin(PXZ |PZ) ≥ k and seed random variable
R which is uniformly distributed over {0, 1}d, the statistical distance between PE(X,R)RZ and
13
P uunifPRZ is less than , where P
u
unif is the uniform probability distribution over {0, 1}u and
Z represents the eavesdropper’s side information.
It was shown in [12] that such a function E can be constructed by two-universal hash
functions.
Deﬁnition 4. Two-universal hash functions [13]
A family of functions F = {f : X → {0, 1}u} is two-universal if
∀x 	= x′ Pf∈F [f(x) = f(x′)] ≤ 2−u, (1.18)
where the probability is with respect to the uniformly random choice of f from the family F .
The leftover hash lemma establishes a connection between strong seeded extractors and
hash functions.
Lemma 2. Leftover hash lemma [13]:
There exists a function chosen uniformly by seed R from two-universal family F which can
be considered as a (k, 1
2
2
u−k
2 )-strong seeded extractor for random variable X with Hmin(PXZ |PZ) ≥
k.
The left over hash lemma directly results in
d(PfR(X)RZ , P
u
unifPZPR) ≤
1
2
√
2u−Hmin(PXZ |PZ) (1.19)
As intuition suggests and as discussed earlier, the minimum entropy plays an important role
in the privacy ampliﬁcation phase.
1.3.3 Simple Binary Hypothesis Testing
The goal of a binary hypothesis test is to map an observation into either H0 (null hy-
pothesis) or H1 (alternative hypothesis). This test speciﬁes a rejection region C where the
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decision is made to reject the null hypothesis. If the distribution of a vector variable is of
interest, the following binary hypothesis test can be deﬁned;
H0 : X ∼ Pθ, θ ∈ Θ0
H1 : X ∼ Pθ, θ ∈ Θ1 (1.20)
If the distribution is deﬁned completely with the hypothesis, (Θ0 = {θ0}Θ1 = {θ1}), it
is called simple, otherwise it is composite. So, in the simple binary hypothesis test Pθ0 is
the distribution of X under the null hypothesis and Pθ1 is the distribution of X under the
alternative hypothesis. A test function Φ(x) ∈ {0, 1} can be deﬁned such that if its value
is 0, the null hypothesis has been decided which means x ∈ Cc, otherwise, if Φ(x) = 1, the
alternative hypothesis has been accepted, x ∈ C.
Two types of error can be explored in a hypothesis test: type-I and type-II. Type-I error
(or false alarm) occurs when H0 is true but the test chooses H1. So, in the simple hypothesis
test
PFA = Pθ0(Φ(X) = 1) =
∑
x
Pθ0Φ(x) = EPθ0 [Φ(X)] (1.21)
Type-II error (or missed detection) happens when H1 is true but H0 is decided by the test.
So, in the simple hypothesis test
PMD = Pθ1(Φ(X) = 0) =
∑
x
Pθ1(1− Φ(x)) (1.22)
= EPθ1 [1− Φ(X)]
Although ﬁnding a region C with PFA = 0 and PMD = 0 is desirable, such a region
does not exist unless Pθ0 is singular with respect to Pθ1 . In other words, by reducing the
probability of missed detection in a simple hypothesis test, the probability of false alarm
would increase. Hence, with a ﬁxed tolerable amount of probability of false alarm, , a test
with minimum probability of missed detection is desirable. Such a test is called the most
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powerful test of size  and the inﬁmum of the probability of missed detection is denoted by
β(Pθ0 , Pθ1). The Neyman Pearson lemma shows that such a test exists and it is given by
the following rejection region
C = {x|Φ(x) = 1} = {x|L(θ0)
L(θ1)
≤ K} (1.23)
where L denotes likelihood function andK is a constant that can be calculated from PFA = .
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CHAPTER 2. SECRET COMMON RANDOMNESS FROM
ROUTING METADATA IN AD-HOC NETWORKS
2.1 Introduction
Automatic key establishment between two devices in a network is generally performed
either by public-key-based algorithms (like Diﬃe-Hellman [14]), or by encrypting the newly-
generated key with a special key-wrapping key [15]. However, in addition to the well-
established, well-investigated keying information exchange, one additional aspect of key es-
tablishment is often understated: to ensure the security of the application it serves, the newly
generated secret key has to be truly random. While minimum standards for software-based
randomness quality are generally being enforced [16], many applications rely on often costly
hardware-based true random generators [17]. Sources of randomness employed by true ran-
dom number generators vary from wireless receivers and simple resistors to ring oscillators
and SRAM memory.
In this chapter, we build upon the observation that a readily-available source of ran-
domness is usually neglected: the network dynamics. Indeed, by their very nature, com-
munication networks are highly dynamic and largely unpredictable. Their randomness is
usually evident in easily-accessible networking metadata such as traﬃc loads, packet delays
or dropped-packet rates. However, as the main focus of our work is on mobile ad-hoc net-
works (MANETs), the source of randomness we shall discuss here is one that is speciﬁc to
infrastructure-less networks: the routing information itself. Another interesting feature of
the routing information, in addition to its randomness, is that it can easily be made available
to the devices that took part in the routing process, but it is usually unavailable to those
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devices that were not part of the route. This idea opens the door to a whole new class of
applications: with the proper routing protocol, the routing information could be used for es-
tablishing secret common randomness between any two devices in a mobile ad-hoc network.
This common randomness could then be further processed into true common randomness,
and used as secret keys.
Common randomness was pioneered in [5, 6, 18], where it is shown that if two parties,
Alice and Bob, have access to two correlated random variables (RVs) X ′ and Y ′ respec-
tively, (in either the source or the channel models), a secret key can be established between
them through public discussions and random-binning-like (e.g. hashing) operations. The
key should remain secret from an adversary eavesdropper (Eve) who overhears the public
discussions, and possesses side information (in the form of a third RV Z) correlated with
that available at Alice and Bob. Common-randomness-based key establishment generally
consists of three phases. First, Alice and Bob have to agree on two other RVs X and Y ,
such that H(X|Y ) < H(X|Z) and H(Y |X) < H(Y |Z), where H(·) is the standard Shannon
entropy. This part is sometimes called advantage distillation. Next, Alice and Bob (and also
Eve) sample their respective random variables a large number of times, producing sequences
of values. Then Alice and Bob exchange further messages (over a public channel) to agree
on the same single sequence of values – this phase is the information reconciliation. Finally,
because the agreed-upon sequence is not completely unknown to Eve (Eve can sample her
variable Z synchronously with Alice and Bob), Alice and Bob run a randomness extractor on
it, to produce a secret key (a shorter sequence) which, from Eve’s perspective, is uniformly
distributed over its space – this is the privacy ampliﬁcation phase. The ideas of [5, 6] have
been recently applied to secret key generation in wireless systems, where secure common
randomness is attained by exploiting reciprocal properties of wireless channels or other aux-
iliary random sources in the physical layer [19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27]. One noteworthy
observation is that, while the work of [5, 6, 18] considers an information-theoretic approach,
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in practice Alice and Bob do not usually have access to large numbers of values drawn from
their random variables, but rather to only one or a few values. To address this issue, [9]
shows that for such single-shot scenarios, the smooth minimum entropy provides tight upper
and lower bounds on the achievable size of the secret key.
In MANETs, the lack of infrastructure, the nodes’ mobility and the fact that packets are
routed by nodes, instead of ﬁxed devices, have resulted in the need for specialized routing
protocols, like the ad-hoc on-demand distance vector AODV routing, or the dynamic source
routing (DSR) [28]. For our secret-common-randomness-extraction purposes, DSR appears
to be a good candidate, and will be the object of this work. Indeed, for generating secret
common randomness between two separated nodes in the network, they must have some
shared and extractable information. Among other routing protocols in ad hoc networks, DSR
has this primary feature. Namely, DSR contains two main mechanisms – Route Discovery
and Route Maintenance – which work together to establish and maintain routes from senders
to receivers. The protocol works with the use of explicit source routing, which means that
the ordered list of nodes through which a packet will pass is included in the packet header.
It is sets of these routing lists that we shall show how to process into secret keys shared
between pairs of nodes.
Our contributions can be summarized as follows:
1. We show that the randomness inherent in an ad-hoc network can be harvested and
used for establishing secret keys between pairs of nodes that participate in the routing
process.
2. We provide a very practical algorithm for establishing such secret common randomness,
based on the DSR protocol, and we calculate a lower bound and an upper bound on
the achievable number of shared secret bits, using an adversary’s beliefs.
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3. We simulate a realistic ad-hoc network in OPNET Modeler, and show that within only
ten minutes, thousands of secret bits can be shared between diﬀerent node pairs.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Those parts of the DSR protocol that
are essential for understanding our algorithm are examined in Section 2.2. In Section 2.3, we
describe the system model and state our assumptions. Section 2.4 describes our proposed key
establishment algorithm. Simulation results obtained with OPNET Modeler are presented
and discussed in Section 3.7.
2.2 Dynamic Source Routing
Dynamic source routing (DSR) [28] is one of the well-established routing algorithms for
ad-hoc networks. Under this protocol, when a user (the sender) decides to send a data packet
to a destination, the sender must insert the source route in a special position of the packet’s
header, called the DSR source route option. The source route is an ordered list of nodes that
will help relay the packet from its source to its destination. The sender transmits the packet
to the ﬁrst node in the source route. If a node receives a packet for which it is not the ﬁnal
destination, the node will transmit the packet to the next hop indicated by the source route,
and this process will continue until the packet reaches its destination.
To obtain a suitable source route toward the destination, a sender ﬁrst searches its own
route cache. The route cache is updated every time a node learns a new valid path through
the network (whether or not the node is the source or the destination for that path). If
no route is found after searching the route cache, the sender initiates the route discovery
protocol. During the route discovery, the source and destination become the initiator and
target, respectively.
As a concrete example, suppose node 1 in Figure 2.1 wants to send packets to node 5.
Initially, node 1 does not have any route toward node 5, and thus node 1 initiates a route
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Figure 2.1 Communication among node 1 and 5
discovery by transmitting a single special local broadcast packet called route request. The
route request option is inserted in the packet’s header, following the IP header. To send the
route request, the source address of the IP header must be set to the address of the initiator
(node 1), while the destination address of IP header must be set to the IP limited broadcast
address. These ﬁelds must not be changed by the intermediate nodes processing the route
request. A node initiating a new route request generates a new identiﬁcation value for the
route request, and places it in the ID ﬁeld of the route request header. The route request
header also contains the address of the initiator and that of the target. The route request
ID is meant to diﬀerentiate between diﬀerent requests with the same initiator and target
– it should be noted here that the same request may reach an intermediate or destination
node twice, over diﬀerent paths. Each route request header also contains a record listing the
address of each intermediate node through which this particular copy of the route request
has been forwarded. In our example, the route record initially lists only the address of
the initiator node 1. As the packet reaches node 2, this node inserts its own address in the
packet’s route record, and broadcasts it further, and so on, until the packet reaches the target
node 5, at which point its route record contains a valid route (1-2-3-4-5) for transmitting
data from node 1 to node 5.
As a general rule, recent route requests received at a node should be recorded in the
node’s route request table – the suﬃcient information for identifying each request is the
tuple (initiator address, target address, route request ID). When a node receives a route
request packet, several scenarios can occur. First, if the node is the target, it sends a route
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reply packet to the initiator, and saves a copy of the route (extracted from the route request
route record) in a table called the route cache. Second, if the node has recently seen another
route request message from this same initiator, carrying the same id and target address, or if
the node’s own address already exists in the route record section of the route request packet
(the same request reached the node a second time), this node discards the route request.
Third, if the request is new, but the node is not the target, the node inserts its address in
the packet’s route record, and broadcasts the modiﬁed packet. Fourth, if a route exists to
the target address in the node’s route cache, the node sends the route reply.
In our example in Figure 2.1, node 5 constructs a route reply packet and transmits it
to the initiator of the route request (node 1). The source address in the IP header of the
route reply packet is set to the IP address of the sender of the route reply (node 5). In our
example, node 5 is also the target. But this need not occur. Under the DSR protocol, it is
possible that an intermediate node (who is not the target of the route request) already has a
path to the target in its route cache. Then it is this node that transmits the route reply back
to the initiator, and it is its IP address that gets inserted in the source IP address part of
the route reply packet’s header. The route reply packet header also contains a route record.
This route record starts with the address of the ﬁrst hop after the initiator and ends with the
address of the target node (regardless of whether the node that issues the route reply is the
target or not). In our example, the route record contained in the route reply packet is (2, 3,
4, 5). Including the address of the initiator node 1 in the route record would be redundant,
as the address of node 1 is already included as the destination address in the IP header of
the route reply packet. The combination of the route record and destination address in the
IP header is the source route which the initiator will use for reaching its target. It is also
noteworthy that network routes are not always bidirectional. That is, it may not always
be possible for node 5 to send its route reply to node 1 using a route obtained by simply
inverting the source route. In the more general case, node 5 has to search its own route
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cache for a route back to node 1. If no such path is found, node 5 should perform its own
route discovery for ﬁnding a source route to node 1.
2.3 System Model
Mobile ad-hoc networks (MANETs) consist of mobile nodes communicating wirelessly
with each other, without any pre-existing infrastructure. We consider a bidirectional MANET
employing dynamic source routing (DSR), in which the nodes (corresponding to the mobile
devices of the network’s users) are moving in a random fashion in a pre-deﬁned area. The
bidirectional network assumption is usually a practical one, especially when all the nodes in
the network belong to the same class of devices (e.g. smart phones)1.
According to the route discovery protocol outlined in Section 2.2, every single node in the
network is assumed equally likely to be the initiator of a route request packet, at any given
time. Furthermore, we assume that the target of any route request is uniformly distributed
among the remaining nodes. Any route discovery instance will return a path through the
network (the source route), of a given length. The length of a returned path is distributed
according to a probability distribution that depends on all the parameters of the network.
Deriving a model for this probability distribution, based on the network parameters, is
outside the scope of this work. Hence, in the remainder of this chapter, we shall assume that
all nodes have access to such an (empirically-derived) probability distribution over the path
lengths. That is, if we denote the random variable describing the length of some path r by
Lr, then we assume that all the nodes have access to the prior p(Lr = l), for l = 2, 3, . . .. For
our experiments, we run our simulation for a long time, and derive p(Lr = l) by counting the
paths of equal length. We also assume that all paths of the same length are equally probable.
1It should be noted that our algorithm should work (albeit with some reduction in performance) even if
the network is not bidirectional. In this case, the route request ID needs to be inserted in the route reply
packet. The reduction in performance for this scenario follows from the security considerations – namely,
more nodes are involved in the routing mechanism, and hence have access to the source route.
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To express this notion, denote the random variable that samples a path (or a partial path)
by R. Then we can write p(R = r|Lr = l) = 1Nl if the length of path r is l (otherwise
the probability is zero), where Nl is the total number of paths of length l. This leads to
p(R = r) = 1
Nlr
p(Lr = lr), where lr is the length of path r.
Our protocol, called KERMAN runs by making each node collect in a table all the source
routes that it is part of – recall that since the network is assumed to be bidirectional, a node
can extract the route request ID, the initiator and the target from the route request packet,
save them in a temporary table, and then, if a route reply packet carrying a source route
with the same initiator and target is observed within a pre-determined time interval, the
node can associate the source route with the route request ID, and save both in a long-term
table.
This mechanism brings about our security model. Since the common randomness es-
tablished between two nodes by our algorithm consists of the source routes, it should be
clear that several other nodes can be privy to this information. For instance, all the nodes
included in a particular source route have full knowledge of this route. Moreover, it is likely
that the route reply packet carrying a source route can be overheard by malicious eavesdrop-
pers that are not part of the source route at all. Therefore, to achieve a level of security,
two nodes will have to gather a large collection of source routes, such that none of the other
nodes that appear in any of the source routes in this collection has access to all the routes in
the collection. Unfortunately this is not enough, because it is still possible that one of the
nodes, most likely a node that is part of many – though not all – routes in the collection,
eavesdropped on all the remaining routes that it is not part of.
We deal with this problem by making an additional assumption: we assume that any two
source routes are exchanged under independent and uniformly distributed network arrange-
ments. That is, for the exchange (route discovery) of each source route, all the nodes in the
network are distributed uniformly, and independently of other exchanges, in their pre-deﬁned
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Figure 2.2 The area covered by l nodes
area. Moreover, the network remains the same for the entire duration of the route discovery
and the associated data transmission. These assumptions are realistic for moderate network
loads, and imply that the network nodes move around fast relative to the time between two
diﬀerent route discovery phases, but slow relative to the duration of a single communication
session. This means that for any source route, the probability that any node which is not
itself part of the route overhears the route (by overhearing a route reply or a data packet) is
only a function of the network parameters. In the remainder of this section, we show how to
compute the probability that an eavesdropper Eve knows a source route of which it is not
part.
Denote the binary random variable encoding whether an eavesdropper Eve overhears a
source route r by KEve(r). Then p(KEve(r) = 1) depends on: (a) Eve’s reception radius, (b)
the total area of the network (all the places where Eve could be during the communication
session corresponding to source route r), and (c) the length of the path. The computation
is described in Figure 2.2, where it can be observed that the worst-case scenario for a path
of length l is when all the l nodes are arranged in a straight line. In this case, we can use
the following worst-case approximation (obtained by ﬁrst calculating the area of a circular
segment):
p(KEve(r) = 1|Lr = l) = Shaded area in Figure 2.2, where circles have radius de
Total network area
=
lπd2e − 2(l − 1)d2e(π3 −
√
3
4
)
Stotal
=
d2e(1.91 · l + 1.23)
Stotal
, (2.1)
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where de is the maximum eavesdropping range (the radius of the circles in Figure 2.2), which
is assumed the same for each of the nodes (all nodes transmit with the same power, using
isotropic antennas), and Stotal is the total area of the pre-deﬁned location where the nodes
can move.
Finally, for brevity of presentation in the current version of this work, two additional
assumptions are made: the attackers are purely passive eavesdroppers (as attackers – oth-
erwise, they are allowed to initiate well-behaved communication, just like any other node),
and they do not collude. Dealing with active and colluding attackers is the subject of future
work.
2.4 Proposed Algorithm
In this section we introduce KERMAN, aK ey-E stablishment algorithm based on Randomness
harvested from the source routes in a MANET employing the DSR algorithm. To estab-
lish secret common randomness between two nodes in the MANET, KERMAN uses the
standard sequence of three steps outlined in Section 2.1: advantage distillation, information
reconciliation and privacy ampliﬁcation.
2.4.1 Advantage Distillation
To accomplish advantage distillation, every node in the network has to maintain a new
table called the Selected Route Table, or SRT. The SRT contains those source routes that
include that node’s address, and for which the route’s destination and route-reply sender
do not coincide. To demonstrate how the SRT is built, we consider the following example.
Take the scenario in Figure 2.3, in which node 1 and 6 are the source and the destination,
respectively. Since node 1 does not have any route to node 6, it generates and broadcasts a
route request packet. Assume that the id of this packet is 14, which means that this is the
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fourteenth attempt that node 1 makes to reach node 6. Further assume that the route request
ﬁrst reaches node 5 over the path 1-2-3-4-5. As seen in Figure 2.3, node 5 will generate the
route reply from its own route cache (because we assumed that node 5 already knows how to
reach node 6). The transmission path of the route reply from node 5 to node 1 is the upper
path in Figure 2.3 (that is, 5-4-3-2-1), and is consistent with a bidirectional network. Each
intermediate node that receives this route reply inserts the source route in their own SRT.
The SRT has three columns dubbed RID, partial route and full route respectively. RID is a
tuple that consists (Source IP, Destination IP, route request ID, route-reply-sender IP). In
our scenario, nodes 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 will all record an entry in their respective SRTs, with
the RID 1-6-14-5. The intermediate nodes (2, 3 and 4) can obtain the route request ID by
searching their own route request tables as discussed in Section 2.2. The partial route ﬁeld of
the SRT entry identiﬁes those other nodes that are supposed to have this particular route in
their SRT – in this case, nodes 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5. The full route ﬁeld is the entire route from
source to destination, which will be used for data transmission (1,2,3,4,5,6 in this case). The
SRTs of the nodes 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 have the same following entry:
RID Partial Route Full Route
1-6-14-5 1-2-3-4-5 1-2-3-4-5-6
It should be noted that, because node 6 did not directly hear the route request from node 1,
it has no way of determining the route request ID in the RID, and this is why it cannot store
this entry in its SRT, although it will most likely learn the source route from the received
data packets that follow the route discovery phase. Thus, although node 6 will not use this
speciﬁc route for establishing a secret key with one of its peers, when discussing the security
of the established secret common randomness between two other peers sharing this route,
node 6 will be considered a possible eavesdropper (i.e. node 6 will be assumed to have full
knowledge of the full route). Each full route in a nodes’ SRT is only available to a limited
number of nodes in the network, i.e., those nodes which are included in in the source (full)
27
Figure 2.3 Example for proposed algorithm
route, along with some nodes who are not part of the source route but happen to overhear the
route request and route reply exchange. The following proposition states that SRT entries
are unique in the whole network.
Proposition 1. If two nodes have the same RID in their own SRTs, then the full routes
associated with this RID in two SRTs are exactly the same.
Proof. Based on the DSR protocol [28], in the phase of processing a received route request,
several steps must be performed in a well-deﬁned order. The step consisting of the search in
the route request table is done before the phase of sending route reply from the route cache.
But if, while searching the route request table, a node ﬁnds that it has received this route
request before, the node must discard the route request packet. Hence, an intermediate node
can initiate the route reply only in response to the ﬁrst route request, and will ignore all
subsequent route requests with the same ID, source and destination. Since the SRT only
contains routes in which the destination is diﬀerent than the route reply sender, it is not
possible that multiple route replies originate from the same node in response to the same
route request, even if the route request was received multiple times, via diﬀerent paths. Now,
although two diﬀerent route replies in response to the same route request can originate at
diﬀerent nodes, (for example, in Figure 2.3 node 7 also knows a path to node 6 and initiates
a route reply), the RIDs corresponding to these route replies contain the IP of the route
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reply sender, and hence are diﬀerent. Note that if the SRT contained routes for which the
destination and the route-reply sender coincide, multiple routes could be associated with the
same RID – this is an undesirable eﬀect, and needs to be prevented by properly constructing
the SRT.
2.4.2 Information Reconciliation
Information reconciliation is usually a complex process, involving techniques from channel
or source coding, and displaying very restrictive lower bounds on the amount of information
that needs to be transmitted over a public channel [9] – these bounds can often leave very
little uncertainty for an eavesdropper. Fortunately, KERMAN is particularly well-suited for
information reconciliation, and only requires minimal communication overhead. This is due
to the fact that in KERMAN the common randomness is based on full routes, and each full
route is uniquely identiﬁed, at both parties, by its RID, thus making reconciliation simpler.
Let us assume that two nodes –call them Alice and Bob for simplicity – realize that they
share a large number of routes in their SRTs. For instance, Alice could ﬁrst notice that
Bob is part of a large number of partial routes in her SRT, and could ask Bob to perform
information reconciliation, with the purpose of eventually generating a shared secret key.
Upon Bob’s acceptance, Alice sends him the list of RIDs corresponding to the partial routes
in Alice’s SRT that include the address of Bob. Bob can then verify whether he already has
the received RIDs in his SRT, and can send back to Alice only those RIDs that he could not
locate. The information reconciliation is now complete. Alice and Bob share a set of full
routes, which constitute their common randomness.
There is but one caveat. As mentioned in Section 2.4.1, the RIDs consist of the tuples
(Source IP, Destination IP, route request ID, route-reply-sender IP) corresponding to each
route request/ route reply pair. Moreover, it is possible that Alice and Bob are neither the
source nor the destination, nor the route-reply sender. Thus, transmitting an RID in the
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clear, over a public channel, may expose up to ﬁve nodes of the route (source, destination,
route-reply sender, Alice and Bob) to an eavesdropping adversary. Many practical solutions
can be employed to limit the amount of information that the reconciliation leaks to potential
eavesdroppers. As a starting point, several solutions are provided in [29].
But such solutions are outside the scope of this work. Instead, we take a diﬀerent
approach, and provide a lower bound and an upper bound on the total number of secret bits
achievable by KERMAN, network-wide. For the lower bound, we consider the case when the
RIDs are indeed transmitted in the clear, while for the upper bound, we consider the case
where the RIDs are transmitted while being completely protected (by some hypothetical
encryption mechanism) from any potential eavesdroppers. In both scenarios, however, we
assume that every node in the network can see that Alice and Bob exchange RIDs – and
thus any eavesdropper knows that the identities of Alice and Bob are part of the full routes
used for secret key generation.
2.4.2.1 The lower bound: RIDs transmitted in the clear
Some information about the full routes is known to leak from the corresponding RIDs.
But exactly how much information leaks is subject to the properties of the (Alice, Bob,
route, RID) tuple. More precisely, these tuples can be divided into seven types, which can
then be grouped into three diﬀerent groups, according to their information-leakage behavior,
as shown in Table 2.1. Group 1 consists of the cases in which the RID reveals information
about a single node, in addition to Alice and Bob. Groups 2 and 3 include the cases in which
the RIDs leak information about two and three nodes, respectively, in addition to Alice and
Bob. In Table 2.1, A and B stand for Alice and Bob (and are interchangeable), while X and
Y represent two nodes other than A and B. For example, in Group 2, type 4 , Alice is the
source but destination and route replier are two distinct nodes other than Bob.
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Table 2.1 Diﬀerent groups and types when we send RID in clear
Group Type Source Destination RREP Sender
1 1 A B X
2 A X B
3 X A B
2 4 A X Y
5 X A Y
6 X Y A
3 7 X Y Z
2.4.2.2 The upper bound: RIDs completely protected
In this case, the only information that leaks to an eavesdropper in the process of infor-
mation reconciliation is that the identities of Alice and Bob have to appear in every one of
the full routes, the RIDs of which are being exchanged between Alice and Bob.
2.4.3 Privacy Ampliﬁcation
For the purposes of this section we shall represent the full routes as sets of node identiﬁers,
or addresses. Alice and Bob share a list of common full routes. Now Alice and Bob can
construct the setM = {m1,m2, . . . ,mh} wheremi (we’ll call it a trimmed route) is produced
from the full route ri, by removing the addresses of Alice and Bob. At this point, full routes
and trimmed routes are in a one-to-one correspondence. However, it is essential that the
reader remembers the diﬀerence between a full route and a trimmed route.
In the next step, Alice partitions the set of trimmed routes M into several disjoint
subsets Mk ⊂ M of various sizes hk, such that, for any Mk = {m1,k,m2,k, . . . ,mhk,k}, the
probability that any node in the network has knowledge of all the hk trimmed routes is less
than a small security parameter 1. This means that, with probability larger than 1 − 1,
there exists at least one trimmed route in H that Eve knows nothing about – note that this
is true for any identity that Eve may take (except, of course Eve cannot be Alice or Bob). It
31
is the full route corresponding to this trimmed route (diﬀerent from any node’s perspective)
that constitutes the randomness of the generated secret.
To extract a secret from each of the sets Mk, Alice ﬁrst represents all the full routes
by binary strings of the same length (according to a mapping previously agreed upon by
all the nodes in the network). The length of the strings is determined as the logarithm to
base two of the total number of possible full routes, in a practical scenario. For example,
from our simulations, we noticed that full routes are limited to 15 nodes, which means
that trimmed routes are limited to 13 nodes. In a network of 50 nodes, there are thus(
48
1
)
3!+
(
48
2
)
4!+ . . .+
(
48
13
)
15! possible full routes involving Alice and Bob, where the factorial
terms account for all the possible arrangements. For example, there are
(
48
1
)
trimmed routes
of length 1, and their corresponding full routes have length 3 (this includes the node that
deﬁnes the trimmed route, Alice and Bob), and there are 3! = 6 possible arrangements of
these three nodes. This total number of possible full routes amounts to representing each
full route on 78 bits. The binary sequences representing the full routes corresponding to the
trimmed routes in Mk are then XORed together.
The result is inserted into a (k, 2)-randomness extractor (deﬁned in 3), which outputs
a shorter bit string sk – the secret. The secret sk should satisfy the (1, 2)-security deﬁned
below.
Deﬁnition 5. In the context of a MANET, a piece of secret common randomness sk estab-
lished between two nodes Alice and Bob is called (1, 2)-secure if, with probability larger than
1 − 1, the secret sk is 2-close to uniform from the perspective of any node in the network,
except Alice and Bob.
It has been shown in [9] that the number of completely random bits that can be extracted
from a bit sequence should be upper bounded by, but very close to, the smooth min-entropy
of the sequence. Thus, for the purposes of this chapter, we shall only focus on the (smooth)
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minimum entropy of a full route, viewed from the perspective of an eavesdropper. This
minimum entropy is a good indication of the number of secret random bits that can be
extracted from each set Mk, and can be calculated according to Deﬁnition 1, where the
probability distribution is that which characterizes Eve’s belief about the full route. Eve’s
belief depends on whether the RID is sent in clear or perfectly protected.
2.4.3.1 The lower bound: RIDs transmitted in the clear
When the RIDs are communicated between Alice and Bob in the clear, Eve will be
able to infer some information about the corresponding full routes agreed on by Alice and
Bob. In addition, the very fact that Eve did not overhear the full route can also leak
some information: longer routes are more likely to have been overheard by Eve. Thus, we
are primarily concerned with the probability distribution p(r|KEve(r) = 0, RID(r))), where
KEve is the binary random variable encoding whether Eve knows the full route (KEve = 1)
or not (KEve = 0), and RID(r) is the RID corresponding to the route r. Since we already
saw that the information leaked to Eve from the RID depends on the group corresponding to
the tuple (Alice, Bob, route, RID) – see Table 2.1 – and since for a speciﬁc group all routes
of the same length are equally probable from Eve’s perspective , we can write:
p(r|KEve(r) = 0, RID(r))) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
p(Lr=lr|KEve(r)=0,group=1)
(N−3lr−3)(lr−2)!
, group = 1
p(Lr=lr|KEve(r)=0,group=2)
(N−4lr−4)(lr−2)!
, group = 2
p(Lr=lr|KEve(r)=0,group=3)
(N−5lr−5)(lr−2)!
, group = 3
(2.2)
where N is the total number of nodes in the network, the random variable Lr represents the
length of the full route (lr is the actual length of route r), and the denominators stand for
the possible number of routes of length lr, and belonging to group i, with i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. For
example in the case of group 1, the number of full routes with length lr in which Eve already
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knows the identities of three nodes (see Table 2.1) is equal to
(
N−3
lr−3
)
(lr − 2)!. This is because
the unknown lr−3 nodes can be picked in
(
N−3
lr−3
)
ways, and then all the nodes, except source
and destination, can be arranged in (lr − 2)! ways.
It now remains to compute p(Lr = lr|KEve(r) = 0, group = 1). We can write:
p(Lr = lr|KEve(r) = 0, group = i) =
=
p(Lr = lr|group = i)p(KEve(r) = 0|Lr = lr, group = i)∑
l
p(Lr = l|group = i)p(KEve(r) = 0|Lr = l, group = i) , (2.3)
where
p(Lr = lr|group = i) = p(Lr = lr)p(group = i|Lr = lr)∑
l
p(Lr = l)p(group = i|Lr = l) . (2.4)
Now p(Lr = l) is derived empirically from our simulation results, as explained in Section 2.3,
while p(group = i|Lr = l) can be written as:
p(group = i|Lr = l) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
6
(lr)
1
(lr−1) , i = 1
6
(lr)
(lr−3)
(lr−1) , i = 2
2(lr−3)
(lr)
(lr−4)
(lr−1) , i = 3.
(2.5)
To explain (2.5) consider, for example, p(group = 2|Lr = lr) = p(type = 4|Lr = lr)+p(type =
5|Lr = lr)+p(type = 6|Lr = lr) (see Table 2.1). The three probabilities on the right hand side
are all equal. Let’s now look at p(type = 4|Lr = lr). Consider a given route of length lr, where
the component nodes are indexed as 1 (source), . . . , lr (destination), and imagine that Alice,
Bob and the route-reply node (RR) pick uniformly randomly amongst these indices, with the
caveat that Alice cannot be equal to Bob. Then p(type = 4|Lr = lr) = p(Alice = 1)p(Bob 	=
RR ∧Bob ∈ {2, . . . , lr − 1}) + p(Bob = 1)p(Alice 	= RR ∧Alice ∈ {2, . . . , lr − 1}) = 2 1lr lr−3lr−1 .
Finally, whether Eve has eavesdropped a certain route or not does not depend on the
roles of Alice and Bob in the path, nor on the identity of the route-reply sender. So we can
write the last remaining term of (2.3) as p(KEve(r) = 0|Lr = lr, group = i) = p(KEve(r) =
0|Lr = lr) = 1− p(KEve(r) = 1|Lr = lr), which can be computed from (2.1).
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2.4.3.2 The upper bound: RIDs completely protected
When the RID is perfectly protected, the probability of a certain route, from Eve’s
perspective, depends solely on its length.
Since all unknown routes of a given length are equally probable from Eve’s perspective,
we can write
p(r|KEve(r) = 0)) = p(Lr = lr|KEve(r) = 0)(N−2
lr−2
)
lr!
, (2.6)
where the denominator represents the number of all possible routes of length lr that contain
Alice and Bob (similarly to (2.2)). Now we can write the probability on the right-hand side
as:
p(Lr = lr|KEve(r) = 0) =
=
p(Lr = lr)p(KEve(r) = 0|Lr = lr)∑
l
p(Lr = l)p(KEve(r) = 0|Lr = l) . (2.7)
In the right-hand side of (2.7), p(Lr = lr) is the empirically-derived probability distribution
discussed in Section 2.3, while p(KEve(r) = 0|Lr = lr) = 1− p(KEve(r) = 1|Lr = lr) can be
computed from (2.1).
2.4.3.3 The partitioning algorithm
Now the remaining question is how many subsetsMk we can form. To solve this problem,
for any pair of nodes we organize the full set of all trimmed routes M as a selection matrix.
In the selection matrix, a row corresponds to one of the trimmed routes in M. A column
corresponds to a node’s address.
There are 48 columns (one for each node in the MANET, except Alice and Bob). Each
entry in the matrix is the probability that the node in the respective column knows the
full route corresponding to the respective row. The selection matrix can be represented as
follows:
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⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
node 1 node 2 . . . node t
m1 a11 a12 . . . a1t
m2 a21 a22 . . . a2t
...
...
...
. . .
...
mh an1 an2 . . . ant
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
where aij is the probability that node j knows full route i. For example, when node j is
a part of the full route corresponding to the trimmed route i, then aij = 1. Otherwise,
aij = p(Kj(i) = 1|Li = li), where lr is the length of route i. The partitioning algorithm
consists of constructing distinct sub-matricesMk, each consisting of hk rows ofM, such that
the product of the entries in each column of Mk be less than 1. We shall informally call this
property 1-security, and we shall use the terms subset and sub-matrix interchangeably. An
optimal partition maximizes the number of sub-matrices Mk with the 1-security property.
Here we propose a na¨ıve partitioning algorithm.
For the upper-bound scenario (perfectly protected RIDs), we build M1 by selecting the
ﬁrst row in the selection matrix, and adding the next row in the selection matrix, until the
column-wise product condition holds. Then we move to the next row, and start building
M2, and so on, until we run out of rows in M.
For the lower-bound scenario (RIDs sent in the clear), we perform one more step: we
append to each row of selection matrix a number which indicates the group of the corre-
sponding RID. Since min-entropy for each group is diﬀerent, and the number of extractable
random bits is related to the min entropy, before applying the na¨ıve algorithm, Alice and
Bob should sort their routes based on the group number. That is, routes whose RIDs place
them in groups with higher min-entropy come ﬁrst. Note that in a subset with routes from
diﬀerent groups, Alice and Bob have to consider the worst-case scenario. As a concrete
example, if a subset contains routes from groups 3,3,3,2,1 and group 1 has the least min
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Table 2.2 Number of subsets, obtained by the na¨ıve algorithm with 1 = .001, for
RIDs sent in the clear. Total network-wide achievable number of shared
secret bits, in last column.
No. of Subsets 1 2 3 4
Group 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 Btotal
No. of Pairs-na¨ıve 203 125 3 31 16 1 4 2 0 3 1 0 862
Table 2.3 Number of subsets, obtained by the na¨ıve algorithm with 1 = .001, for
protected RIDs. Total network-wide achievable number of shared secret
bits, in last column.
No. of Subsets 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Btotal
No. of Pairs-na¨ıve 215 75 22 6 1 0 1 4.98 · 103
entropy, the group can only produce a number of random bits equal to the min entropy of
group 1. This is due to the fact that the worst-case scenario is when an eavesdropper knows
all routes, except that belonging to group 1 (recall that Alice and bob do not know who the
eavesdropper might be).
As an alternative to the na¨ıve algorithm, In [30] we provided a better-performing (but
more complex) heuristic algorithm for calculating upper bound, that goes as follows. Starting
with the original selection matrix, we inspect all sub-matrices of two rows, and check whether
any of them satisﬁes the 1-security property. If any such disjoint sub-matrices are found, we
count the corresponding subsets of rows Mk, we update the selection matrix by removing
these rows from the original selection matrix, and we go on to inspect all the sub-matrices
consisting of three rows of the updated selection matrix.
So far, the algorithm seems to perform optimally. However, the main problem that pre-
vents the algorithm from being optimal arises because in general several partially-overlapping
sub-matrices can be formed at each step. For example, consider a scenario where two sub-
matrices of two rows have been found to satisfy 1-security: say these sub-matrices are the
one consisting of rows 2 and 6 of the selection matrix, and the one consisting of rows 2 and
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8. Clearly, only one of them can be considered for privacy ampliﬁcation, lest we compromise
the entropy of the secret key. We now have to decide which of the two choices results in an
updated selection matrix that is more likely to perform better in future partitions. For our
example, if row 6 is less than row 8 (i.e. component i or row 6 is less than component i of
row 8, for all i), then we should select the sub-matrix containing rows 2 and 8, because row
6 might prove more useful in the future. But because such an ordering of matrices is usually
not clear-cut, we proceed to deﬁne our own partial order, which is essentially sub-optimal,
and responsible for the sub-optimality of our heuristic algorithm.
Deﬁnition 6. Average-Column-Product Sub-Optimal Partial Order (ACP-PO): For any
two partially-overlapping sub-matrices Mi and Mj of the selection matrix, with Mi
⋂Mj =
Mij 	= ∅, we say that Mi is better than Mj in the ACP-PO sense, and write Mi ≺ Mj if
the mean of the column-wise products of elements of Mi is less than mean of the column-
wise products of elements of Mj. We say that Mi is at least as good as Mj in the ACP-PO
sense, and write Mi  Mj if the mean of the column-wise products of elements of Mi is
less than or equal to the mean of the column-wise products of elements of Mj.
Our algorithm is illustrated by the pseudo-code fragment of Algorithm 1. The algorithm
starts by checking whether at least one sub-matrix verifying the 1-security condition can
be found – that is, whether the whole original selection matrix satisﬁes 1-security. The
algorithm then ﬁnds all the sub-matrices of SubsetSize rows ofM that satisfy 1-security, and
orders them according to the ACP-PO deﬁned above. Recall that this partial order is only
meaningful for two sub-matrices that have at least one row in common, but our algorithm
orders the whole list of subsets anyway. After sorting all sub-matrices in descending ACP-
PO we pick and process the ﬁrst sub-matrix. We then make sure that the rows we already
picked are not going to be considered again, by updating the ordered list and the selection
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matrix M . The algorithm will then continue to select sub-matrices from the remaining list,
and when the list becomes empty, it switches the search to sub-matrices with more rows.
Algorithm 1 Heuristic Algorithm
1: M=Selection Matrix;
2: SubsetSize = 2;
3: NumberSubsets = 0;
4: L =Number of rows in M ;
5: while Subsetsize ≤ L AND M satisﬁes 1-security do
6: for All combinations Mk of Subsetsize rows do
7: if Mk satisﬁes 1-security then
8: Calculate average of column-wise products;
9: Sort subsets based on the average of column-wise products;
10: while Not End of List do
11: Select and process ﬁrst subset in the ordered list and increment NumberSubsets;
12: Delete from the list all subsets that share rows with the selected subset;
13: Update M by deleting all the rows in the selected subset;
14: Increment SubsetSize;
15: Update L;
To gain more insight into the algorithm’s complexity, consider a case in which the initial
selection matrix has h1 rows. In the ﬁrst stage, the algorithm examines
(
h1
2
)
partitions (sub-
matrices), and if it ﬁnds any that satisfy 1 security, it updates the selection matrix, which
will end up with h2 ≤ h1 rows. The second stage inspects
(
h2
3
)
partitions, and so forth. All
in all the heuristic algorithm should examine
(
h1
2
)
+
(
h2
3
)
+
(
h3
4
)
+ ... partitions, which for most
cases should be a lot less than 2h1 . However, if there is no reduction in the number of rows in
the ﬁrst stages, the algorithm has to explore all 2h1 partitions. Several simplifying solutions
can be considered to avoid this situation: (1) if it is observed that over a pre-determined
period of time the algorithm produces only sub-matrices with at least S0 rows, then the
algorithm can start with SubsetSize = S0 rather than SubsetSize = 2; (2) the algorithm
can test whether at least two sub-matrices are even possible, by testing whether the whole
(updated) selection matrix M satisﬁes 21-security. If it does not, then the algorithm can stop
searching for sub-matrices, and can process the whole selection matrix as a single sub-matrix.
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2.5 Simulation Results
2.5.1 Secret Length and The Secret Bit Rate
The proposed protocol has been simulated in OPNET, using the parameters indicated in
Table 2.4. This choice of parameters results in a maximum eavesdropping range of de = 12m.
Each node sends packets to four random destinations. The number of full routes vs the full
Table 2.4 Simulation Parameters
Simulation Parameters Value
Network Size 100m*100m
Number of Nodes 50
Simulation Duration 600(sec)
Transmit Power(w) .005
Packet Reception-Power Threshold(dBm) -55
Speed(meters/seconds) uniform(.5,1)
Packet Inter-Arrival Time(seconds) exponential(1)
route length is shown in Figure 2.4, and the empirically-derived prior p(Lr = lr) looks similar.
As we discussed earlier, the probability distribution of the unknown full route, used in
calculating the min-entropy, can be obtained from (2.2) (for the lower bound) or from (2.6)
(for the upper bound).These probability distributions are given in Table 2.5.
It can be easily seen that when RID is sent in clear we have Hmin(r|KEve(r) = 0, group =
1) = − log2(0.428) = 1.22, Hmin(r|KEve(r) = 0, group = 2) = − log2(0.13462) = 2.893 and
Hmin(r|KEve(r) = 0, group = 3) = − log2(0.0261) = 5.257, while if the RID is perfectly
protected we get Hmin(r|KEve(r) = 0)) = − log2(0.00062) = 10.66.
In Figure 2.5 we show the number of pairs of nodes that share selection matrices, versus
the number of rows in these shared matrices. Clearly, the larger the number of rows in the
shared selection matrix, the higher the potential for generating more shared secret bits.
The number of subsets produced by the na¨ıve partition algorithm for the whole network is
shown in Tables 2.6 and 2.2, for 1 = 10
−3. We also calculate the maximum achievable total
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Figure 2.4 Number Of Full Routes vs. Full Route Length
Figure 2.5 Number Of Pairs vs. Number of Rows in their shared Selection matrix
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Table 2.5 Probability Distribution of an Unknown Full Route, from Eve’s Perspec-
tive based on Sending RID Type
Route Length 3 4
probability (Clear) 6.2E-4 9.0E-06
Group (Protected) 1 2 3 1 2 3
probability (Protected) .428 0 0 .003 0.1346 0
Route Length 5 6
probability (Clear) 9.7E-08 1.1E-09
Group (Protected) 1 2 3 1 2 3
probability (Protected) 2.2E-05 .001 .026 1.9E-07 8.4E-06 2E-04
Route Length 7 8
probability (Clear) 1.1E-11 1.1E-13
Group (Protected) 1 2 3 1 2 3
probability (Protected) 1.5E-09 6E-08 1.8E-06 1.2E-11 4.5.5E-10 1.5E-8
Route Length 9 10
probability (Clear) 1.2E-15 9.9E-18
Group (Protected) 1 2 3 1 2 3
probability (Protected) 1E-13 5.1E-12 1E-10 8.5E-16 3.7E-14 1E-12
Route Length 11 12
probability (Clear) 1E-19 1E-21
Group (Protected) 1 2 3 1 2 3
probability (Protected) 9.5E-18 4.12E-16 1.1E-14 9E-20 3.8E-18 1.05E-16
Route Length 13 14
probability (Clear 1.6E-23 2E-25
Group (Protected) 1 2 3 1 2 3
probability (Protected) 1.05E-21 4.5E-20 1.23E-18 1.27E-23 5.4E-22 1.48E-20
Route Length 15
probability (Clear) 2E-27
Group (Protected) 1 2 3
probability (Protected) E-25 5.7E-24 1.57E-22
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Figure 2.6 Number Of subsets of a given size (number of rows), vs. Subset size, for
the na¨ıve algorithm (Clear RID) – network-wide results.
network-wide number of shared random bits (between all the possible pairs in the network),
Btotal – this is shown in the last columns of Tables 2.6 and 2.2. For example, for 1 = 10
−3
we have an upper bound of Btotal = 10.66 · (215 · 1 + 75 · 2 + 22 · 3 + 6 · 4 + 1 · 5 + 1 · 7).
Additionally, the numbers of subsets with a given size (number of rows) are shown for the
whole network in Figure 2.6 and Figure 2.7, for the lower-bound and upper-bound scenarios,
respectively.
To compare na¨ıve and heuristic algorithms for 1 = 10
−3, the number of sub-matrices
satisfying 1-security, produced by two algorithms for the whole network in the case of
protected RID, is shown in table 2.6. We have brought the simulation results for heuristic
algorithm in [30] and the rest of this section has been devoted to the na¨ıve algorithm, unless
otherwise stated.
Additionally, we evaluate the secret bit rate, relative to transmission overhead. Since
the routing information we use for the generation of secret bits comes free (and is normally
discarded), we normalize the number of secret bits by the number of bits transmitted for the
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Figure 2.7 Number Of subsets of a given size (number of rows), vs. Subset size, for
the na¨ıve algorithm (Protected RID) – network-wide results.
Table 2.6 Number of subsets, obtained by the na¨ıve and heuristic algorithms with
1 = .001, when considering all full routes of length at least 3 and in the
case of protected RID.
No. of Subsets 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
No. of Pairs-na¨ıve 215 75 22 6 1 0 1 0 0
No. of Pairs-heuristic 171 70 39 25 9 2 1 2 1
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purposes of information reconciliation, as in Section 2.4.2. Recall that for the reconciliation
of each full route, an RID is transmitted, consisting of three node addresses and a route-
request ID. For a network of 50 nodes, and noticing that in our simulations the route-request
ID does not exceed the value of 500, the RID can be encoded on 3 · log2(50) + 9 = 26
bits. The additional packet header overhead is ignored here, because it is easily amortized
– we could transmit many such RIDs in a single packet. The average subset size for the
na¨ıve algorithm in the case of unprotected RIDs is 9.53, and for protected RIDs it is 9.89.
This implies an overhead transmission of 9.53 · 26 = 238.25 and 9.89 · 26 = 257.14 bits per
subset, respectively. The secret bit rate, relative to transmission overhead is thus given by
1.87/238.25 = .00786 (lower bound) and 10.66/257.14 = .0414 (upper bound) secret bits per
bit of overhead.
2.5.2 The Eﬀects of Speed and Transmission Range
2.5.2.1 The eﬀects of node speed
To see the eﬀect of the nodes’ speed in the number of achieved random bits, we have
simulated two additional networks, with the same parameters as those in Table 2.4, except
with node speeds distributed uniformly over (1, 1.5)m/s and over (1.5, 2)m/s, respectively.
Based on our simulation results, the numbers of full routes of any length in the whole
network, for speeds chosen as uniform(0.5, 1) (the original network), uniform(1, 1.5) and
uniform(1.5, 2) were respectively 14544, 18768 and 19900. For fully-protected RIDs, the
minimum entropies (or the numbers of secret bits that can be extracted from a full route
unknown by the eavesdropper), are 10.66, 10.61 and 10.67, respectively. For the case when
the RIDs are sent in the clear, the min entropies corresponding to diﬀerent groups are given
in Table 2.7.
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Table 2.7 Size of min-entropy based on 3 diﬀerent speeds in the case of clear RID.
Speed 1, speed 2 and speed 3 are uniform (.5,1), uniform (1,1.5) and
uniform (1.5,2), respectively.
Speed 1 Speed 2 Speed 3
Hmin(r|KEve(r) = 0, group = 1) 1.22 1.237 1.267
Hmin(r|KEve(r) = 0, group = 2) 2.893 2.756 2.800
Hmin(r|KEve(r) = 0, group = 3) 5.257 4.988 5.075
Table 2.8 Number of node pairs vs. number of subsets for three diﬀerent speeds
by applying na¨ıve algorithm with 1 = .001, when RID is sent in the
clear. Total network-wide achievable number of shared secret bits, in last
column. Speed 1, speed 2 and speed 3 are uniform (.5,1), uniform (1,1.5)
and uniform (1.5,2), respectively.
No. of Subsets 1 2 3 4 5
Group 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 Btotal
No. of Pairs, speed 1 203 125 3 31 16 1 4 2 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 862
No. of Pairs, speed 2 209 127 1 62 34 0 13 10 0 2 4 0 0 1 0 1153
No. of Pairs, speed 3 265 147 1 51 26 0 5 8 0 0 4 0 1 1 0 1172
The increase in the number of route requests being generated at the whole network level
with the increase of the nodes’ speeds is expected, since higher node speeds result in an
increased number of broken links – therefore, nodes have to send new discovery packets for
ﬁnding new paths. On the other hand, the increase in the number of paths of a given length
is roughly proportional to the original number of paths, thus leading to roughly the same
minimum entropy values.
The number of achieved random bits, along with the number of subsets in the whole
network are shown in Tables 2.8 and 2.9 for 1 = 10
−3. Not surprisingly, the total network-
wide number of achieved shared secret bits (between any pairs of nodes) also increases with
the node speeds.
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Table 2.9 Number of node pairs vs. number of subsets for three diﬀerent speeds by
applying na¨ıve algorithm with 1 = .001, when RID is protected. Total
network-wide number of shared secret bits, in last column.Speed 1, speed
2 and speed 3 are uniform (.5,1), uniform (1,1.5) and uniform (1.5,2),
respectively.
No. of Subsets 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Btotal
No. of Pairs, speed 1 215 75 22 6 1 0 1 4.98 · 103
No. of Pairs, speed 2 200 77 37 17 12 3 2 6.63 · 103
No. of Pairs, speed 3 260 86 31 12 6 2 1 6.65 · 103
Table 2.10 Size of min-entropy based on 4 diﬀerent ranges in the case of clear RID.
Range range=3 range=6 range=9 range=12 range=15
Hmin(r|KEve(r) = 0, group = 1) .16 .65 1.056 1.22 1.023
Hmin(r|KEve(r) = 0, group = 2) 1.26 1.88 2.581 2.893 2.64
Hmin(r|KEve(r) = 0, group = 3) 2.58 3.988 4.751 5.257 4.74
2.5.2.2 The eﬀects of transmission range
In the following, we explore the eﬀect of the wireless node range in the number of attained
random bits. To perform this experiment, we simulate networks with the same parameters
as those in Table 2.4, except with diﬀerent wireless node ranges: 3, 6, 9 ,12 and 15 meters.
The number of secret random bits per subset in the case of fully-protected RIDs, for wireless
ranges 3, 6, 9, 12 and 15 meters, are 8.49, 9.45, 10.28 , 10.66 and 10.25 bits respectively. In
the case of RIDs sent in the clear, the entropy for each group in above the ranges is shown
in Table 2.10. The total number of secret random bits, along with the number of subsets in
the whole network is shown in Tables 2.11 and 2.12 for 1 = 10
−3 in the case of protected
and clear RID respectively.
Based on simulation results, the number of full routes of any length in the whole network
for these ﬁve ranges (3, 6, 9, 12 and 15 meters) are respectively 852, 2815, 8984, 14544 and
21648. When the transmission range increases, the nodes can establish communication links
more easily, causing an increase in the number of full routes, and hence in the number of
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Table 2.11 Number of subsets, obtained by the na¨ıve algorithm with 1 = .001, in
the case of sending RID in clear for diﬀerent transmission range. Total
network-wide achievable number of shared secret bits, in last column.
No. of Subsets 1 2 3 4 5
Group 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 Btotal
No. of Pairs, range=3 27 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 89
No. of Pairs, range=6 121 15 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 113
No. of Pairs, range=9 234 122 1 14 6 0 2 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 651
No. of Pairs, range=12 203 125 3 31 16 1 4 2 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 862
No. of Pairs, range=15 213 109 0 48 13 0 10 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 1480
Table 2.12 Number of node pairs vs. number of subsets for ﬁve diﬀerent ranges by
applying na¨ıve algorithm. Total network-wide number of shared secret
bits, in last column.
No. of Subsets 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Btotal
No. of Pairs, range=3 29 1 0 0 0 0 0 263.19
No. of Pairs, range=6 134 6 0 0 0 0 0 1.38 · 103
No. of Pairs, range=9 284 60 5 2 0 0 0 4.39 · 103
No. of Pairs, range=12 215 75 22 6 1 0 1 4.98 · 103
No. of Pairs, range=15 207 75 26 5 7 0 0 5.02 · 103
48
shared secret bits. On the other hand, by increasing the transmission range, an eavesdropper
can get information about routes more easily. It is therefore expected that the number of
shared secret bits decreases as the transmission range keeps increasing beyond a certain
point. For example when the range is 50m, the eavesdropper will overhear any route.
2.5.3 Increasing The Secret’s Length by Spoiling Knowledge
Spoiling knowledge was introduced in [12] as a means of (publicly) adjusting a probability
distribution to increase its min entropy. In our speciﬁc example, this translates to purposely
discarding the most likely full routes from the SRT. But since all routes of the same length
have the same probability (from Eve’s perspective), we can only increase the min entropy
by discarding all the routes of a given length. The downside, of course, is that the number
of partitions satisfying the properties outlined in Section 2.5.1 also decreases.
To show the eﬀect of spoiling knowledge, we have considered a scenario in which the
speed of nodes is uniform (.5,1) and maximum eavesdropping range is 12 meters. In this
part we have compared the results for two diﬀerent algorithms, i.e., na¨ıve algorithm and
heuristic algorithm. For our speciﬁc scenario, disregarding the full routes of length 3 yields
a min entropy of roughly Hmin(r|KEve(r) = 0)) = − log2(9.02 · 10−6) = 16.76 bits. The
number of subsets produced for the whole network, for 1 = 10
−3, is shown in table 2.13,
for our two diﬀerent partitioning algorithms. In this case, Btotal is 6.13 · 103 bits for na¨ıve
algorithm and 7.59 ·103 bits for heuristic algorithm. It is interesting to note that the spoiling
knowledge technique achieves a gain of roughly 23% and 49%, in the na¨ıve algorithm and in
the heuristic algorithm respectively.
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Table 2.13 Number of subsets, obtained by the na¨ıve and heuristic algorithms, when
considering only full routes of length at least 4. Total network-wide
achievable number of shared secret bits, in last column.
No. of Subsets 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
No. of Pairs-na¨ıve 195 60 11 2 2 0 0 0
No. of Pairs-heuristic 165 56 31 11 5 1 0 1
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CHAPTER 3. ON THE SECRET KEY CAPACITY OF
SIBLING HIDDEN MARKOV MODELS
3.1 Introduction
Establishing a secret key between two or more legitimate parties is the basic principle of
cryptography and secure communication. In the absence of public-key infrastructure, sev-
eral alternative key-establishment approaches have been proposed, and rely on information-
theoretic methods. The merit of such approaches is that they oﬀer information-theoretic
security, and thus do not rely on any assumptions on the computational capabilities of ad-
versaries. Key establishment based on information theoretic methods was initially studied
by Maurer [5] and Ahlswede and Csisza´r [6]. By considering the i.i.d repetitions of corre-
lated random variables at the disposal of two legitimate users, called Alice (X) and Bob
(Y ) and one eavesdropper, named Eve (Z), it was shown that when X − Y − Z form a
Markov chain, the secret key capacity equals the conditional mutual information I(X, Y |Z).
This result holds under the additional assumption that Alice and Bob can communicate
over an error-free but insecure public channel, and the eavesdropper Eve cannot manipulate
the information exchanged between Alice and Bob over this channel (the passive attacker
assumption).
The abundance of research building on [5] and [6] maintains the i.i.d character of the
correlated processes available to Alice, Bob and Eve. Nevertheless, it is becoming increas-
ingly clear that real-life scenarios have to be approached based on non-i.i.d assumptions. As
a concrete example, in the recently published KERMAN protocol [31, 30], Alice and Bob
establish a secret key from routing meta-data in an ad hoc network. More precisely, their
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source of randomness is the network’s connectivity, which is highly dynamic due to the move-
ment of mobile nodes in the ad hoc network. However, [31, 30] rely on the assumption that
various observations of the network by the same participant are independent of each other
– such an assumption is practical when the network observations are obtained (sampled)
at intervals of time large enough to de-correlate them1. This is the equivalent of the fast
fading assumption in wireless channels. By contrast, in this chapter we study the scenario in
which the network evolves slowly (relative to the network-observation sampling time), and
consequently the network states at two contiguous sampling times are correlated.
We model the network with a Markov chain – in which a state could describe the net-
work connectivity, perhaps represented as an adjacency matrix – and we model the network
observation mechanism by a noisy channel – at each time instant, an observer would see
an incomplete or noisy version of the adjacency matrix. The speciﬁcs of the observation
channel are beyond the scope of this chapter. Instead, we proceed to investigate the se-
cret key capacity of a Sibling Hidden Markov Model (SHMM), where two legitimate users
and one eavesdropper have access to imperfect observations of the same underlying Markov
chain. The applicability of this new model is much more general than the network observa-
tion example outlined above. The model can accurately capture the behavior of any source
model for common randomness, as long as the source can be approximately modeled as
a Markov chain. Additional practical examples of interest include: noisy observations of
wireless transmissions of correlated data (text, voice or moving images [33, 34]), imperfect
observation of the evolution of a complex system (like a community in a social network, or
a geographic community [35, 36] – in this case, the legitimate parties’ advantage could be
based on a better cultural understanding and interpretation of the observed phenomena),
imperfect observations of power ﬂuctuations at diﬀerent points of a smart grid [37], etc.
1Experimental characterizations of the autocorrelation exhibited by the observed phenomena, like the
investigation of MIMO channel gains in [32], can be used to determine the downsampling necessary to
satisfy the i.i.d. assumptions. Nevertheless, such downsampling comes at the cost of secrecy rate losses.
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Figure 3.1 Sibling Hidden Markov Model for generating the secret key
One technical problem arises immediately. Since the techniques used for studying i.i.d
cases are based on typicality arguments, they cannot be readily employed for non-i.i.d models
such as the HMM. To evaluate the secret key capacity of the SHMM, our approach starts by
extending known single shot results. Tyagi and Watanabe [38] propose to upper-bound the
secret key capacity in terms of the probability of missed detection in a binary hypothesis test.
We shall use this bound, along with the single shot lower bound studied in [39] to explore
the secret key capacity of the SHMM. The main diﬃculty in our approach comes from the
method’s computational complexity. To address this issue, we transform the bounds into a
log-likelihood ratio of the joint probabilities of the observed variables, and notice that the
computational obstacle resides in the non-additivity of the log-likelihood ratio. At this point,
following a method developed by Fuh in [40], we express each joint probability distribution
as the L1 norm of a product of random matrices. It was shown in [40] that the logarithm
of this matrix product norm can be written as a cumulative functional of a Markov chain,
which under certain common assumptions converges to a Lyapunov exponent (as the size of
the chain grows towards inﬁnity). Finally, we employ numerical methods to estimate each
of the Lyapunov exponents, and compute our bounds.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides a brief overview
of the related work. In section 3.3 we describe the system model and assumptions, while
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in section 3.5 we present the derivation of the upper and lower bounds on the secret key
capacity of the SHMM. In section 3.6, we explain how we can express the bounds in terms of
the L1 norms of products of random matrices, and ﬁnally in terms of Lyapunov exponents,
and we discuss how to calculate each Lyapunov exponent based on a numerical method.
Section 3.7 is devoted to simulation results, while section 3.8 contains concluding remarks.
We should mention that partial results from this chapter were previously published in [41].
By comparison, the current version provides the characterization of both lower and upper
bounds, and is more complete and self-contained.
3.2 Related Work
Two important techniques to study single-shot scenarios have been developed, namely
smooth entropies and information spectrum methods [42]. As an example of the smooth
entropy method, in [9] Renner and Wolf derived single-shot upper and lower bounds on the
size of the secret key. In [43], new bounds were proposed based on the large deviation tech-
nique and the idea of smoothing, while [44] derived new bounds for the length of the secret
key based on the information spectrum methods. Unfortunately extending these bounds
not only to our SHMM model, but even for simpler non-i.i.d cases is not computationally
tractable [38].
Hayashi and Watanabe studied the problem of secure uniform random number generation
(SURNG) for Markov chains in [45]. In this problem X and Y are two correlated random
variables with joint distribution PXY . The aim is to build a new random variable from X
which has no correlation with Y . To produce such a random variable, a two-universal hash
function is applied to the random variable X. The authors have considered a Markov model
with the transition matrix W (x, y|x′, y′) = P (Xn = x, Yn = y|Xn−1 = x′, Yn−1 = y′). This
model has been shown in Figure 3.2. The authors evaluated the Re´nyi entropy for the Markov
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Figure 3.2 Markov Model for generating the secret key
chain in terms of a newly deﬁned measure: the Re´nyi entropy for the transition matrix. To
derive computable asymptotic bounds based on diﬀerent discussed asymptotic regimes [45]
and non-asymptotic bounds, the transition matrix must be non-hidden or strongly non-
hidden. A transition matrix is non-hidden if
∑
xW (x, y|x′, y′) = WY (y|y′) and it is strongly
non-hidden if
∑
xW (x, y|x′, y′)1+θ is independent of x′ for every θ ∈ (−1,∞). Although
this Markov model has its own merit and application, we believe that our proposed SHMM
applies to a broader range of real-life scenarios.
3.3 System Model
In the study of non-i.i.d cases, the information-spectrum methods of [46] are powerful
tools. In the remainder of this section we formalize our SHMM, and we introduce some
notation and terminology from hypothesis testing [47, 48, 49] – this terminology is relevant
for understanding the upper and lower bounds of [50], which are the starting point in our
study. The reader familiar with these concepts can skip ahead to Section 3.5.
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3.4 Generating Secret Key Problem
Assume that the common randomness at the disposal of Alice and Bob is represented
by two correlated random variables, X and Y respectively. In addition, assume that an
adversary Eve possesses side information (Z) correlated with the two legitimate users’ in-
formation (X, Y and Z take values from X ,Y and Z respectively). Alice and Bob want to
generate a secret key through the use of an additional public but authenticated channel, i.e,
the adversary eavesdropper can overhear the public discussion, but cannot actively interfere
with it. The key establishment process is constructed, as usual, of two phases: information
reconciliation and privacy ampliﬁcation. In the information reconciliation phase, the legit-
imate users exchange communication over the public channel, and end up agreeing on the
same exact randomness-bearing sequence. Communication between Alice and Bob in this
phase can be either one-way or interactive. Since some information about the agreed-upon
randomness-bearing sequence has been revealed to Eve from both her own side information
Z and from the the public communication of the former phase, the goal of privacy ampli-
ﬁcation is to increase the secrecy of the ﬁrst phase output. This is usually performed by
applying a randomness extractor. Eventually, Alice and Bob will have random variables KA
and KB respectively as their shared secret key. The two keys have to be the same with high
probability, and have to be distributed uniformly given the adversary’s knowledge.
Deﬁnition 7. Alice and Bob, by public communication represented as F , can generate an
(, δ)−secure secret key [51] if
P (KA = KB = K) ≥ 1− 
and
d(PKFZ ,
1
|K|PFZ) ≤ δ
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where
d(P,Q) =
1
2
∑
x
|P (x)−Q(x)|.
In Deﬁnition 7, d is the statistical distance (also known as the total variation distance),
and quantiﬁes the distance between the real and the ideal probability distributions. Note
that the probability distribution of the the secret key is ideally uniform and independent
of Eve’s information. It is known [52] that the statistical distance deﬁned above can be
equivalently expressed as d(P,Q) = maxX0⊂X{|P (X0)−Q(X0)|}.
A new deﬁnition of the secret key, called “-security”, was proposed in [50] by combining
the conditions in Deﬁnition 7:
Deﬁnition 8. -secure secret key can be generated between Alice and Bob if
d(PKAKBFZ , PunifPFZ) ≤ ,
where
Punif (KA, KB) =
 (KA = KB)
|K| .
3.4.1 Sibling Hidden Markov Models
As discussed in section 3.1, we study a model in which Alice (Xn), Bob (Yn) and Eve (Zn)
have access to imperfect observations of a source represented by a Markov chain (Sn). This
model has been illustrated in Fig 3.1. Although our approach can theoretically be applied to
random variables taking values from ﬁnite sets, due to computational issues, our study has
been restricted to all-binary random variables, i.e, Xn, Yn, Zn and Sn ∈ {0, 1}. Moreover, we
have assumed that the underlying Markov chain is irreducible and aperiodic, and that its
initial distribution is the stationary distribution, π. The transition matrix for the underlying
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Markov chain is represented by TS
TS =
⎡
⎢⎣1− αS αS
βS 1− βS
⎤
⎥⎦ .
Corresponding emission matrices for Alice, Bob and Eve are denoted respectively by
EA =
⎡
⎢⎣1− αA αA
βA 1− βA
⎤
⎥⎦ , EB =
⎡
⎢⎣1− αB αB
βB 1− βB
⎤
⎥⎦
and
EZ =
⎡
⎢⎣1− αZ αZ
βZ 1− βZ
⎤
⎥⎦ .
3.5 The Secret Key Establishment Potential of the Sibling
Hidden Markov Model
3.5.1 Upper Bound
It is only feasible for Alice and Bob to generate secret bits when, conditioned on Eve’s
side information, they have additional shared information. Based on this idea, [50] derived
a single-shot upper bound for the length of the -secure secret key length (S(X, Y |Z)) in
terms of β (deﬁned in 1.3.3), as a distance between the joint probability distribution PXY Z
and PX|ZPY |ZPZ . Namely, for every 0 ≤  < 1 and 0 < η < 1− , we have
S(X, Y |Z) ≤ − log β+η(PXY Z , PX|ZPY |ZPZ) (3.1)
+2 log(
1
η
).
58
Unfortunately, there is currently no way to eﬃciently calculate β directly for our SHMM.
However, by deﬁning the spectrum divergence [53] between two distributions as
Ds(Pθ0 ||Pθ1) (3.2)
= sup{R : Pθ0{x ∈ X : log
Pθ0(x)
Pθ1(x)
≤ R} ≤ },
and by applying the Neyman Pearson lemma, we have the following lemma [44].
Lemma 3. For every  ∈ {0, 1} and 0 < η1 < 1 − , the following relation between β and
the spectrum divergence holds:
−D+η1s (Pθ0‖Pθ1)− log
1
η1
≤ log β ≤ −Ds(Pθ0‖Pθ1). (3.3)
Consequently, the following upper bound for the achievable -secure secret key length
can be expressed by combining (3.1) and (3.3):
S(X, Y |Z) ≤ D+η1+ηs (PXY Z ||PX|ZPY |ZPZ) (3.4)
+ log(
1
η2η1
).
The advantage of (3.4) over (3.1) resides in computational costs which will be discussed
in the upcoming sections. By extending the new single-shot upper bound for a sequence of
length n, for every 0 ≤  < 1 and 0 < η, η1 < 1 − , the maximum length of an -secure
secret key can be written as
S(X
n, Y n|Zn) (3.5)
≤ D+η1+ηs (PXnY nZn ||PXn|ZnPY n|ZnPZn)
+ log(
1
η2η1
).
3.5.2 Lower Bound
Recently [39] proposed a protocol to generate a single-shot secret key based on inter-
active communication. The results of [39] can be considered as an achievable lower bound
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for the length of the secret key. Recall that the protocol has two steps: information rec-
onciliation and privacy ampliﬁcation. As discussed in section 1.3.1, intuition suggests that
Hmax(PXY |PY ) bits have to be communicated between Alice and Bob in the information
reconciliation phase for every realization of (X, Y ). This amount can be proved by the single
shot Slepian-Wolf theorem [54]. Nevertheless, [39] proposes an interactive communication
protocol to decrease the number of exchanged bits for speciﬁc realizations of (X, Y ). To
this end, the spectrum of PX|Y is divided into L slices, each of width Δ. This technique is
called information slicing and was introduced in [46]. Instead of binning X with the bin
size of Hmax(PXY |PY ) bits, the bin size starts from almost Hmin(PXY |PY ) and is increased
iteratively, each time by as much as Δ bits. As a consequence of this method, it can be
observed that when Hmin(PXY |PY ) coincides with Hmax(PXY |PY ) then it is suﬃcient that
Alice and Bob communicate with each other just one time – no need for spectrum slicing.
This observation makes things a bit easier for us – namely, in the asymptotic regime, where
the probability distributions concentrate at their averages, and Hmin becomes close to Hmax,
we can actually achieve the lower bound through a very simple protocol, in which the entire
reconciliation information is transmitted in one step. By contrast, in the non-asymptotic
case, even if we could calculate the lower bound, the protocol to achieve it would not be
feasible, as the slicing technique involves calculating the (smooth) minimum and maximum
conditional entropies of X given Y – in turn, this relies on the calculation of the entire
spectrum of PX|Y .
In the general case, the number of bits that need to be exchanged between Alice and
Bob in this reconciliation protocol is roughly log 1
Px|y
for the speciﬁc realization (x, y) of
(X, Y ). Moreover, for privacy ampliﬁcation the authors of [39] have used two-universal hash
functions as strong seeded extractors. Altogether, based on the proposed protocol, we can
derive the lower bound of the length of the secret key, i.e, for every η3 > 0 and λ ≥ 0, there
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exists an (, δ)-secure secret key taking value from a set S ∈ {0, 1}u with
 ≤ PXY (T0) + L2−η3 (3.6)
and
δ ≤ P (iXY (X, Y )− iXZ(X,Z) ≤ λ+Δ) + L2−η3 (3.7)
+
1
2
√
2u−λ+η3+3 logL +
1
L
+ PXY (T0),
where
iXY (x, y) := log
PXY (x, y)
PX(x)PY (y)
and
T0 = {(x, y)| log 1
PX|Y (x, y)
< Hmin(PXY |PY ) or
log
1
PX|Y (x, y)
> Hmax(PXY |PY )}.
The secret key capacity C when X, Y and Z are n-symbol sequences, can be deﬁned as
1/n times the length of the secret key when the security parameters such as  and δ go to
zero.
Lemma 4. The upper bound and lower bound of the secret key capacity for a sequence is equal
to the left most point in the spectrum of 1
n
log PXnY nZnPZn
PXnZnPY nZn
and 1
n
log(PXnY n
PXnZn
PZn
PY n
) respectively,
when (Xn, Y n, Zn) is distributed by PXnY nZn.
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Proof. The upper bound on the secret key capacity is obtained directly from (3.5), and the
lower bound by appropriately choosing the parameters of (3.6) as
L = Ln =
Hmax(PXnY n |PY n)−Hmin(PXnY n |PY n)
Δ
η3 = η3n =
nΔ
2
λ = λn = n(P − lim inf
n→∞
1
n
(iXnY n(X
n, Y n)
−iXnZn(Xn, Zn)))−Δ
= n(P − lim inf
n→∞
(
1
n
log
PXnY n
PXnZn
PZn
PY n
))−Δ.
The third term after the inequality in (3.8) can be written as
1
2
√
2n(
u
n
−λn
n
+
η3n
n
+ 3 logL
n
). (3.8)
So, when n → ∞, ( and δ) → 0, and the lower bound for secret key capacity is P −
lim infn→∞( 1n log
PXnY n
PXnZn
PZn
PY n
).
Our aim is now to evaluate the terms in Lemma 4 in the asymptotic case.
3.6 Calculating the Bounds
According to Lemma 4, we need to compute the probability distributions of the speciﬁc
log-likelihood ratios 1
n
log PXnY nZnPZn
PXnZnPY nZn
and 1
n
log(PXnY n
PXnZn
PZn
PY n
). The main problem in this step
is related to the non-additivity of the logarithm of the joint probability distributions of the
observations. To make it clearer, consider one joint distribution of the observations such as
PXnY n . This distribution can be written as
PXnY n =
∑
Sn
PSnPXn|SnPY n|Sn (3.9)
=
∑
Sn
PS1PX1|S1PY1|S1
n∏
i=2
PSi+1|SiPXi|SiPYi|Si
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where Si ∈ {0, 1} and i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}. Similar expressions, involving intractable sum-
mations, can be written for the other joint probability distributions. To deal with such
intractable summations, [40] employs a method based on the L1 norm of product of random
matrices. Namely, and as an example, PXnY n can be written as follows:
PXnY n = ‖MXn,Yn ... MX2,Y2MX1,Y1π‖ = ‖TnXY π‖ (3.10)
where:
π =
⎡
⎢⎣
βS
αS+βS
αS
αS+βS
⎤
⎥⎦ ,
MX1,Y1 =
⎡
⎢⎣f10(X1Y1) 0
0 f11(X1Y1)
⎤
⎥⎦ ,
MXn,Yn =
⎡
⎢⎣(1− αS)fn0(XnYn) βSfn0(XnYn)
αSfn1(XnYn) (1− βS)fn1(XnYn)
⎤
⎥⎦ ,
TnXY = MXn,Yn . . .MX2,Y2MX1,Y1 , (3.11)
and
fn0 = P (Xn|Sn = 0)P (Yn|Sn = 0), (3.12)
fn1 = P (Xn|Sn = 1)P (Yn|Sn = 1). (3.13)
We can write the other joint distributions in Lemma 4 in a similar way, with the only
diﬀerence appearing in (3.12), (3.13), where, for PXnY nZn ,
fn0 = P (Xn|Sn = 0)P (Yn|Sn = 0)P (Zn|Sn = 0)
fn1 = P (Xn|Sn = 1)P (Yn|Sn = 1)P (Zn|Sn = 1),
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for PXnZn ,
fn0 = P (Xn|Sn = 0)P (Zn|Sn = 0)
fn1 = P (Xn|Sn = 1)P (Zn|Sn = 1),
for PZn ,
fn0 = P (Zn|Sn = 0)
fn1 = P (Zn|Sn = 1),
and for PY n ,
fn0 = P (Yn|Sn = 0)
fn1 = P (Yn|Sn = 1).
In these equations, fn0 and fn1 can be denoted by f0 and f1 respectively, since the emission
matrices do not depend on n.
Now the log-likelihood ratio in the upper bound of lemma (4) can be expressed as
1
n
log
PXnY nZnPZn
PXnZnPY nZn
(3.14)
=
1
n
log(
‖MXn,Yn,Zn ... MX2,Y2,Z2MX1,Y1,Z1π‖
‖MXn,Zn ... MX2,Z2MX1,Z1π‖
=
‖MZn ... MZ2MZ1π‖
‖MYn,Zn ... MY2,Z2MY1,Z1π‖
)
=
1
n
log
‖TnXY Zπ‖‖TnZπ‖
‖TnXZπ‖‖TnY Zπ‖
,
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where TnY , TnZ , TnXZ are deﬁned analogously to (3.11). Similarly, the log-likelihood ratio in
the lower bound of lemma (4) can be written as
1
n
log
PXnY nPZn
PXnZnPY n
(3.15)
=
1
n
log(
‖MXn,Yn ... MX2,Y2MX1,Y1π‖
‖MXn,Zn ... MX2,Z2MX1,Z1π‖
·‖MZn ... MZ2MZ1π‖‖MYn ... MY2MY1π‖
)
=
1
n
log
‖TnXY π‖‖TnZπ‖
‖TnXZπ‖‖TnY π‖
.
For the sake of convenience and since the upcoming discussion is the same for all Tns related
to the diﬀerent joint probability distributions, we denote all of them with Tn. In the general
case, i.e, when all observations related toX, Y, Z are studied, the system {(Sn, Xn, Yn, Zn, Tn)}
is called a product of Markov random matrices.
The product of i.i.d. invertible random matrices was initially studied by [55]. It was
shown that the logarithm of the L1 norm of this product can be written as a simple functional
of a Markov chain, which asymptotically, and taking into account irreducibility assumption,
equals to the upper Lyapunov exponent. In [40] and [56], Fuh develops a methodology for
calculating the asymptotic limits for products of Markov random matrices. The problems
tackled therein refer to the eﬃciency of certain estimators [40] and change-point detection
algorithms [56] in HMMs. The rest of this chapter is based on this methodology, and uses
notation similar to [56].
Now 1
n
log ‖Tnπ‖ can be expressed as
log
‖Tnπ‖
‖Tn−1π‖ + log
‖Tn−1π‖
‖Tn−2π‖ + ... + log
‖T1π‖
‖π‖ . (3.16)
By deﬁningKn =
‖Tnπ‖
‖Tn−1π‖ , and based on the dependency graph of Figure 3.3, (Sn, Xn, Yn, Zn, Kn)
or (Sn, Kn) form a Markov chain. It will be proved in the sequel that this Markov chain has
an invariant probability measure. At a ﬁrst glance, it would seem thatKn is two-dimensional,
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Figure 3.3 Dependency Graph of the Product of Random Matrix
but for our scenario it depends only on a one-dimensional variable. Deﬁne A∗n and B
∗
n as
follows:
Tnπ
‖Tn−1π‖ =
⎡
⎢⎣A
∗
n
B∗n
⎤
⎥⎦ . (3.17)
The left hand side of the above equation can be written as
Tnπ
‖Tn−1π‖ =
MnTn−1π
‖Tn−2π‖
‖Tn−2π‖
‖Tn−1π‖ , (3.18)
and thus Kn we can be expressed as:
log
‖Tnπ‖
‖Tn−1π‖ = log ‖
MnTn−1π
‖Tn−2π‖
‖Tn−2π‖
‖Tn−1π‖‖ (3.19)
= log ‖
⎡
⎢⎣
(1−αS)A∗n−1+βSB∗n−1
A∗n−1+B
∗
n−1
f0
αSA
∗
n−1+(1−βS)B∗n−1
A∗n−1+B
∗
n−1
f1
⎤
⎥⎦ ‖
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According to (3.19), we have following recursive equations for A∗n and B
∗
n:
A∗n =
(1− αS)A∗n−1 + βSB∗n−1
A∗n−1 +B
∗
n−1
f0, (3.20)
B∗n =
αSA
∗
n−1 + (1− βS)B∗n−1
A∗n−1 +B
∗
n−1
f1,
A∗0 =
βS
αS + βS
and B∗0 =
αS
αS + βS
,
and thus
1
n
log ‖Tnπ‖ = 1
n
n∑
1
log(A∗n +B
∗
n). (3.21)
Since the Markov chain (Sn, Xn, Yn, Zn, Kn) has an invariant probability measure, by
using the Ergodic theorem of [57], as n → ∞, (3.21) will converge to Lyapunov exponent γ
(a brief overview of the Lyapunov exponent, including a deﬁnition and historical applications
to similar contexts, is presented in the Appendix):
lim
n→∞
1
n
log ‖Tnπ‖ = γ = E[log(A∗1 +B∗1)]. (3.22)
As a result, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 3. The upper and lower bounds for the secret key capacity based on the binary
SHMM represented in Figure 3.1 when the underlying Markov chain is aperiodic and irre-
ducible can be expressed respectively as the following
lim
n→∞
1
n
log
PXnY nZnPZn
PXnZnPY nZn
= γxyz + γz − γxz − γyz, (3.23)
lim
n→∞
1
n
log
PXnY nPZn
PXnZnPY n
= γxy + γz − γxz − γy, (3.24)
where γxyz, γxy, γxz, γyz, γy and γz are Lyapunov exponents and according to (3.22) they are
related to the TnXY Z , TnXY , TnXZ , TnY Z , TnY and TnZ respectively.
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Note that the left-most point coincides with the right most point in the related spectra
of Lemma 4. So, the gap between the upper bound and the lower bound for the secret key
capacity of the SHMM can be written as
γxyz − γyz − γxy + γy, (3.25)
and when there is no Z (or equivalently Z is a constant), the upper and lower bounds become
equal to each other.
To calculate these Lyapunov exponents, we have to compute the related invariant prob-
ability measure for each case. Based on (3.19), it is clear that Kn depends only on a
one-dimensional variable, Wn =
A∗n
A∗n+B∗n
. The invariant probability measure of the Markov
chain is the same as the stationary distribution of Wn and according to (3.19), it depends
on whether the underlying Markov chain, Sn, is 0 or 1. Consequently, we consider two sta-
tionary densities of Wn, i.e, m0 (when Sn = 0), and m1 (when Sn = 1). We can deﬁne the
joint stationary density of (Sn,Wn) as
P (Sn = i,Wn ≤ x) =
∫ x
0
mi(w)dw. (3.26)
For each TnXY Z , TnXY , TnXZ , TnY Z , TnY and TnZ there are corresponding m0 and m1. It
has been shown in [56] that
m0(x) = (1− αS)
∫ 1
0
∂
∂x
Q0(z(w, x))m0(w)dw (3.27)
+βS
∫ 1
0
∂
∂x
Q0(z(w, x))m1(w)dw,
m1(x) = αS
∫ 1
0
∂
∂x
Q1(z(w, x))m0(w)dw
+(1− βS)
∫ 1
0
∂
∂x
Q1(z(w, x))m1(w)dw
where
z(w, x) =
x
1− x
αSw + (1− βS)(1− w)
(1− αS)w + βS(1− w) ,
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and Qi is as follows:
for TnXY Z :
Qi(z) = P (
f0(XnYnZn)
f1(XnYnZn)
≤ z|Sn = i) (3.28)
for TnXY :
Qi(z) = P (
f0(XnYn)
f1(XnYn)
≤ z|Sn = i) (3.29)
for TnXZ :
Qi(z) = P (
f0(XnZn)
f1(XnZn)
≤ z|Sn = i) (3.30)
for TnY Z :
Qi(z) = P (
f0(YnZn)
f1(YnZn)
≤ z|Sn = i) (3.31)
and for TnZ :
Qi(z) = P (
f0(Zn)
f1(Zn)
≤ z|Sn = i). (3.32)
Equation (3.28) is the Fredholm integral equation of the second kind and m0 and m1 can
be calculated for each Tn from this equation. We will discuss the numerical method to solve
Fredholm itegral in the next section.
Finally, to compute the Lyapunov exponents we can use the iterated expectation formula,
E(X) = E(E(X|Y )) [56]:
γ = E(E(log(A∗n +B
∗
n)|Sn−1,Wn−1)) (3.33)
=
∑
i=0,1
∫ 1
0
∑
j=0,1
P (Sn = j|Sn−1 = i)
·E(log(A∗n +B∗n)|Sn = j, Sn−1 = i,Wn−1 = u)mi(u)du
=
∫ 1
0
[(1− αS)G0(u) + αSG1(u)]m0(u)du
+
∫ 1
0
[βSG0(u) + (1− βS)G1(u)]m1(u)du,
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where
Gj(u) = E(log(A
∗
n +B
∗
n)|Sn = j, Sn−1 = i,Wn−1 = u). (3.34)
Using A∗n and B
∗
n from (3.19), we have
Gj(u) =
∑
i1
log([(1− αS)u+ βS(1− u)]f0(i1) (3.35)
+[αS + (1− βS)(1− u)f1(i1)])fj(i1).
Note that for each Tn we have to calculate corresponding Gj, for example to calculate Gj
for TnXY Z , i1 in (3.35) runs over all the combinations of XY Z.
3.7 Simulation Results
To solve for m, from the Fredholm integral equation (3.28) we have to approximate
two quantities: ﬁrst
∫ 1
0
∂
∂x
Q(z(w, x))m(w)dw and then ∂
∂x
Q(z(w, x)). We discretize both
x and w into N points each, such that 0 = x0 < x1, . . . , < xN = 1 and 0 = w0 <
w1, . . . , < wN = 1. Now the ﬁrst quantity can be approximated as [
1
N
∂
∂x
Q(z(w0, x))]m(w0)+∑N−1
j=1
1
2N
[ ∂
∂x
Q(z(wj, x)) +
∂
∂x
Q(z(wj+1, x))]m(wj) [56], while the second quantity can be ap-
proximated as Q(z(w,x+Δ))−Q(z(w,x))
Δ
, where Δ = 1/N .
Hence, (3.28) can be rewritten in the following matrix form:
70
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
m0(0)
m0(
1
N
)
...
m0(
N−1
N
)
m1(0)
m1(
1
N
)
...
m1(
N−1
N
)
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
=
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
AN×N BN×N
CN×N DN×N
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
m0(0)
m0(
1
N
)
...
m0(
N−1
N
)
m1(0)
m1(
1
N
)
...
m1(
N−1
N
)
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
.
This equation can be expressed as asm = Mm. As depicted, the matrixM is constructed
of four sub-matrices, that is, A, B, C and D. Each of these four sub-matrices can be written
as N column vectors, that is,
AN×N =
[
a1 a2 ... aN
]
,
BN×N =
[
b1 b2 ... bN
]
,
CN×N =
[
c1 c2 ... cN
]
,
DN×N =
[
d1 d2 ... dN
]
,
where
a1 =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1−α
N
∂
∂x
Q0(z(0, 0))
1−α
N
∂
∂x
Q0(z(0,
1
N
))
...
1−α
N
∂
∂x
Q0(z(0,
N−1
N
))
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
,
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ai
i 
=1
=
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1−α
2N
{ ∂
∂x
Q0(z(
i−1
N
, 0)) + ∂
∂x
Q0(z(
i
N
, 0))}
1−α
2N
{ ∂
∂x
Q0(z(
i−1
N
, 1
N
)) + ∂
∂x
Q0(z(
i
N
, 1
N
))}
...
1−α
2N
{ ∂
∂x
Q0(z(
i−1
N
, N−1
N
)) + ∂
∂x
Q0(z(
i
N
, N−1
N
))}
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
,
b1 =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
β
N
∂
∂x
Q0(z(0, 0))
β
N
∂
∂x
Q0(z(0,
1
N
))
...
β
N
∂
∂x
Q0(z(0,
N−1
N
))
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
,
bi
i 
=1
=
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
β
2N
{ ∂
∂x
Q0(z(
i−1
N
, 0)) + ∂
∂x
Q0(z(
i
N
, 0))}
β
2N
{ ∂
∂x
Q0(z(
i−1
N
, 1
N
)) + ∂
∂x
Q0(z(
i
N
, 1
N
))}
...
β
2N
{ ∂
∂x
Q0(z(
i−1
N
, N−1
N
)) + ∂
∂x
Q0(z(
i
N
, N−1
N
))}
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
,
c1 =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
α
N
∂
∂x
Q1(z(0, 0))
α
N
∂
∂x
Q1(z(0,
1
N
))
...
α
N
∂
∂x
Q1(z(0,
N−1
N
))
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
,
ci
i 
=1
=
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
α
2N
{ ∂
∂x
Q1(z(
i−1
N
, 0)) + ∂
∂x
Q1(z(
i
N
, 0))}
α
2N
{ ∂
∂x
Q1(z(
i−1
N
, 1
N
)) + ∂
∂x
Q1(z(
i
N
, 1
N
))}
...
α
2N
{ ∂
∂x
Q1(z(
i−1
N
, N−1
N
)) + ∂
∂x
Q1(z(
i
N
, N−1
N
))}
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
,
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d1 =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1−β
N
∂
∂x
Q1(z(0, 0))
1−β
N
∂
∂x
Q1(z(0,
1
N
))
...
1−β
N
∂
∂x
Q1(z(0,
N−1
N
))
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
,
di
i 
=1
=
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1−β
2N
{ ∂
∂x
Q1(z(
i−1
N
, 0)) + ∂
∂x
Q1(z(
i
N
, 0))}
1−β
2N
{ ∂
∂x
Q1(z(
i−1
N
, 1
N
)) + ∂
∂x
Q1(z(
i
N
, 1
N
))}
...
1−β
2N
{ ∂
∂x
Q1(z(
i−1
N
, N−1
N
)) + ∂
∂x
Q1(z(
i
N
, N−1
N
))}
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
.
The sum of each column in matrix A, B, C andD are 1−α, β, α and 1−β respectively. To
see this, note that
∑N−1
i=1
d
dx
Q(z(w, xi)) = N . This comes from the fact that
d
dx
Q(z(w, xi)) =
Q(z(w,xi+Δ))−Q(z(w,xi))
Δ
, 1/Δ = N , and
∑N−1
i=1 [Q(z(w, xi +Δ))−Q(z(w, xi)] = 1 because Q is
a cummulative distribution function, so Q(z(w, 1)) = 1 and Q(z(w, 0)) = 0. So, the sum
of each column in matrix M is one. This guarantees that the matrix M has an eigenvalue
equal to 1, which means that m is the eigenvector of matrix M corresponding to eigenvalue
1. Hence, m is invariant.
We have simulated this method for several cases. In all of the scenarios, αS = βS unless
otherwise stated and we vary αS from .05 to .5 by increasing .05 in each step.
To study the eﬀect of Eve’s channel on the secret key capacity, we considered symmetric
channels for Alice, Bob and Eve. We ﬁxed Alice and Bob’s crossover probability .2 and .3
respectively and deﬁned corresponding emission matrices as follows
EA =
⎡
⎢⎣.8 .2
.2 .8
⎤
⎥⎦ EB =
⎡
⎢⎣.7 .3
.3 .7
⎤
⎥⎦ .
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Figure 3.4 The upper bound secret key capacity by ﬁxing Alice and Bob’s emission
matrices and changing Eve’s crossover probability
Then we vary Eve’s crossover probability, αZ , from .3 to .5 by increasing it .02 in each
step. The upper and lower bounds of the secret key capacity in this case are depicted in
Figures 3.4 and 3.5. Note that the secret key capacity is dimension-less (its operational
meaning is the number of secret key bits per observed bit). It can be seen when Alice and
Bob’s channel are superior to the Eve’s channel (αA, αB < αZ), Alice and Bob can generate
more secret bits. Moreover, by increasing Eve’s crossover probability the gap between upper
and lower bound decreases and the minimum occurs when Eve’s channel is in worst case
according to Alice and Bob, i.e., when αZ = .5. To show it more accurately, we have
depicted the lower and upper bounds for four diﬀerent values of αZ = .44, .46, .48 and .5 in
Figure 3.6.
Similarly, to evaluate the eﬀect of one of the legitimate user’s channel, such as Bob,
on the secret key capacity, we considered symmetric channels for Alice, Bob and Eve. We
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Figure 3.5 The lower bound secret key capacity by ﬁxing Alice and Bob’s emission
matrices and changing Eve’s crossover probability
Figure 3.6 Comparing the lower and upper bound for four diﬀerent values of Eve’s
crossover probability when Alice and Bob’s emission matrices are ﬁxed.
CP in ﬁgures stands for crossover probability
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Figure 3.7 The upper bound secret key capacity by ﬁxing Alice and Eve’s emission
matrices and changing Bob’s crossover probability
ﬁxed Alice and Eve’s crossover probability .2 and .4 respectively and deﬁned corresponding
emission matrices as follows
EA =
⎡
⎢⎣.8 .2
.2 .8
⎤
⎥⎦ EZ =
⎡
⎢⎣.6 .4
.4 .6
⎤
⎥⎦ .
Then we vary Bob’s crossover probability, αB, from .3 to .5 by increasing it .02 in each
step. The upper and lower bounds of the secret key capacity in this case are depicted in
Figures 3.7 and 3.8. Again, it can be seen when Bob’s crossover probability .4 < αB < .5,
the legitimate user’s channels are not superior to Eve’s channel (αA, αB < αZ). So, they can
generate almost nothing. Moreover, the gap between upper and lower bound is less when
αB is closer to .3. Since, Eve’s channel is worst than legitimate users in this case.
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Figure 3.8 The lower bound secret key capacity by ﬁxing Alice and Eve’s emission
matrices and changing Bob’s crossover probability
3.8 Conclusion
To come closer to real-life scenarios in the context of common-randomness-based secret
key establishment, we investigated the secret key potential of the SHMM. We provided an
upper and a lower bound on the secret key capacity of the model, by extending existing
single-shot results. While directly calculating the bounds for sequences of small length is
computationally feasible, when the observed sequence gets larger the task becomes quickly
intractable. We were able to calculate the upper and lower bounds in the asymptotic case,
based on a technique involving Lyapunov exponents of Markov random matrices, and we
provided the lower and upper bounds for the secret key capacity for several scenarios. It is
interesting to note that the asymptotic case enables not only the calculation of the bounds,
but also the the protocol to achieve the lower bound, while in the non-asymptotic (but large
sequence length) scenarios, not only is it intractable to calculate the bounds directly, but
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even if the lower bound were given the protocol to achieve it is no longer feasible. Future work
could focus on characterizing the secret key capacity of the SHMM in the non-asymptotic
regime.
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APPENDIX A. INFORMATION THEORY
Deﬁnition 9. Consider X to be a random variable with probability distribution PX(x) whose
entropy is deﬁned as follows:
H(X) =
∑
x
pX(x)log
1
pX(x)
(A.1)
Deﬁnition 10. Consider X and Y are two random variables with joint probability distribu-
tion PXY (x, y). Joint entropy and mutual information are deﬁned respectively as follows.
H(X, Y ) =
∑
x,y
pXY (x, y)log
1
pXY (x, y)
(A.2)
I(X;Y ) =
∑
x,y
pXY (x, y)log
pXY (x, y)
pX(x)pY (y)
Deﬁnition 11. Consider X and Y are two random variables with joint probability distribu-
tion PXY (x, y). Conditional entropy of X given Y is deﬁned as follows.
H(X|Y ) =
∑
x,y
pXY (x, y)log
1
pXY (x|y) (A.3)
Deﬁnition 12. Let assume e(x; xn) is the empirical distribution of x in a sequence xn, i.e.,
e(x; xn) = N(x;x
n)
n
, where N(x; xn) is the number of occurrences of x in the sequence xn.
Strongly -typical set T n (X) is then deﬁned as follows:
T n (X) = {xn | |e(x; xn)− p(x)| ≤ , ∀x ∈ X} (A.4)
Deﬁnition 13. Let assume e(x, y; xn, yn) is the empirical distribution of (x, y) in a sequence
(xn, yn), i.e., e(x, y; xn, yn) = N(x,y;x
n,yn)
n
where N(x, y; xn, yn) is the number of occurrences
of (x, y) in the sequence (xn, yn). Then strongly -typical set T n (X, Y ) is deﬁned as follows.
T n (X, Y ) = {(xn, yn) | |e(x, y; xn, yn)− p(x, y)| ≤ , ∀x ∈ X} (A.5)
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Let consider a discrete memoryless channel (DMC) depicted in Figure. Base on the
achievability part of channel coding theorem, it can be proven that there exists a (n, 2nR)
code such that, for every R < I(X;Y ), the average probability of error goes to zero as n
goes to inﬁnity.
An important theorem in distributed source coding that remains in the root of the achiev-
ability proof of secret-key generation in i.i.d case is the Slepian-Wolf theorem. Based on
Slepian-Wolf theorem, the lossless coding rate can be expressed as follows:
R1 ≥ H(X1|X2) (A.6)
R1 ≥ H(X2|X1)
R1 +R2 ≥ H(X1, X2)
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APPENDIX B. LYAPUNOV EXPONENT
To understand the Lyapunov exponent, we start with linear cocycles. In dynamical
systems, linear cocycles are deﬁned as follows [58].
Let (M,B, μ) be a probability space, f : M → M be measure-preserving map and
A : M → Gl(d) be a measurable function, where Gl(d) is the set of invertible d×d matrices.
Then
F : M ×Rd → M ×Rd (B.1)
(x, v) → (f(x), A(x)v)
is a linear cocycle. It can be seen that
F n(x, v) = (fn(x), An(x)v)
where we denoted An(x) = A(fn−1(x))...A(f(x))A(x).
It can be proved [58] that, if
∫
M
log ‖A(x)‖dμ(x) < ∞ for any f-invariant probability
measure μ, then there exists λ : M → R such that the following limit holds μ− a.e.:
lim
n→∞
1
n
log ‖An(x)‖ = λ(x) (B.2)
Moreover, if μ is ergodic then λ(x) is constant and is called the Lyapunov exponent [55].
For our purposes, products of random matrices can be easily modeled as linear cocycles.
To see this, let us assume that {Mi} is the sequence of random matrices and consider f as
a shift map as follows:
f : M → M (B.3)
f(Mi,Mi+1,Mi+2, ...) = (Mi+1,Mi+2, ...).
89
Now consider A as follows:
A : M → Gl(d) (B.4)
A(Mi,Mi+1,Mi+2, ...) = Mi
Hence, An(x) is the product of a sequence of random matrices, and the results for linear
cocycles can be applied to the product of random matrices.
The investigation of Lyapunov exponents in the context of HMMs backs to the study of
entropy rate in these models. In this context, [59] shows that the joint probability distribution
of the observed sequence can be expressed as the product of random matrices. Then, it shows
that the entropy rate of the HMM is the same as the top Lyapunov exponent of this product
of random matrices. However, since calculating Lyapunov exponents is usually not tractable,
[59] proposes an entropy rate evaluation method which does not depend on the computation
of the Lyapunov exponent.
Several techniques have been proposed in the literature for calculating or estimating
Lyapunov exponents. In [60], the authors have derived an upper bound for the Lyapunov
exponent. Pollicott in [61] used numerical methods to approximate the entropy rate in
HMMs, which was expressed based on Lyapunov exponents. Another novel method for
computing Lyapunov exponents was proposed in [62] – it is based on solving numerically an
eigenvalue problem.
Interestingly, the application of Lyapunov exponents has not been restricted to the study
of entropy rates in the HMMs. The authors in [63] show that the capacity of ﬁnite state
Markov channels can also be represented in terms of Lyapunov exponents. To derive this
capacity, [63] uses the product-of-random-matrices technique outlined above.
